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FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid
Joel B. Eisen*
Using an unprecedented historical analysis of over 100 years of law
dating to the Progressive Era, this Article concludes that the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) v. Electric Power Supply Association properly asserted that
FERC has ample authority to pursue broad environmental and energy
goals in transforming the electric grid. Building on the Court’s finding that
FERC may regulate “practices” that “directly affect” rates in wholesale
electricity markets, the analysis develops a detailed standard that is
consistent with interpretation of regulatory statutes in each of three
distinct eras: the Progressive Era, the era of regulation of utilities under
firm-specific tariffs, and the modern, market-based era. This Article also
sets forth and discusses in depth four guiding principles that specify how
FERC may use the “directly affecting” standard to take sweeping
measures to inject new values in the wholesale electricity markets, such as
accounting for environmental externalities. Analyzing FERC’s initiatives
to promote demand response (techniques for reducing electricity
consumption, upheld in FERC v. EPSA) and a hypothetical carbon price
imposed on bids in wholesale markets, the Article broadens our
understanding of what FERC can regulate and what states can regulate,
aiming to lessen ongoing jurisdictional tension and provide a means for
addressing difficult cases involving preemption of state laws. The hope is
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that additional clarity about jurisdictional boundaries will allow for more
valuable innovation and experimentation in refashioning the electric grid.
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INTRODUCTION
Some want the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to
act boldly in transforming the electric grid.1 Others believe it has
overreached its authority when it has acted to promote reduced
electricity consumption, stimulate innovation, and address climate
change.2 This conflict came to a head in FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Association (“FERC v. EPSA”),3 involving FERC’s Order 745.4
1 See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1614, 1666-74 (2014); Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing
Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 (2014) [hereinafter An
Open Access Distribution Tariff] (arguing for FERC to promulgate an “open access
distribution tariff” to promote grid innovation); Steven Weissman & Romany Webb,
Addressing Climate Change Without Legislation, Volume 2: FERC: How the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Can Use Its Existing Legal Authority to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increase Clean Energy Use, BERKELEY ENERGY & CLIMATE
INITIATIVE (2014), available at www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ccelp/FERC_Report_
FINAL.pdf (discussing FERC jurisdiction and numerous policy proposals).
2 See, e.g., Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of
Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2015) (criticizing Order 745 as overreaching).
3 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). See generally Joel B.
Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority over Demand Response
Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69
(2013) [hereinafter Who Regulates the Smart Grid?] (analyzing jurisdictional issues
associated with demand response).
4 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,
Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011); Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart
Grid?, supra note 3, at 72 (discussing Order 745). See generally Richard J. Pierce Jr., A
Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745, 102 GEO. WASH. U. J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102 (2011) [hereinafter Demand Response] (suggesting that a
reviewing court should uphold Order 745).
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Reversing a D.C. Circuit decision, the Supreme Court held that FERC
has authority over “demand response” (techniques by which end-use
customers directly reduce consumption of electricity) in wholesale
electricity markets.5 The Court also held that FERC’s formula for
pricing demand response at the market price — the same price paid to
generators — was not arbitrary and capricious.6 Using a historical
analysis of modern cases and durable principles dating to the
Progressive Era,7 this Article concludes that the Court was correct in
asserting that FERC has ample authority for Order 745, and also
explains that FERC can take sweeping measures such as a “carbon
adder” that would aim at the most pressing energy and environmental
issues of our time.
The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) is largely intact since its 1935
enactment and did not contemplate today’s wholesale markets and
other advances.8 FERC therefore justifies its initiatives under its
existing authorities to prevent “undue discrimination” by regulated
entities in their “practices” affecting wholesale electricity rates (for
convenience, this Article refers to the latter as the “practices affecting
rates” clause).9 FERC’s critics claimed these provisions could not be
stretched to justify Order 745.10 They argued that the FPA cannot be
interpreted broadly to allow it to pursue goals other than achieving
just and reasonable electricity rates, and that doing so for
unauthorized purposes infringes on states’ regulatory authority.11 In
5

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
Id.
7 See infra Part II.
8 See James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and
Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 73 (2014);
Jacobs, supra note 2, at 941.With respect to the wholesale markets specifically, see
Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69
VAND. L. REV. 141, 198 (2016) (noting that the wholesale markets were a “stark
departure from historical practice” and not contemplated in 1935).
9 See infra Part III (discussing these aspects of the FPA).
10 See generally Jacobs, supra note 2.
11 These mirror the ongoing arguments against the use of broad agency discretion
under other statutes, such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s climate change
rules. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)
(overturning portions of EPA rules addressing greenhouse gas emissions); Amanda C.
Leiter, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: A Shot Across the Bow of the Administrative
State, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (2015) (discussing UARG and claiming
that it “creates a presumption against reading ambiguous statutory text to grant agencies
authority that is either ‘too expansive’ or ‘too expensive.’”). Other recent challenges to
EPA’s interpretations of the Clean Air Act include EPA v. EME Homer Generation, L.P.,
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (states challenged EPA’s rule regulating interstate pollution
6
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FERC v. EPSA, the Court soundly rejected these and other arguments
against Order 745.12
The aim of this Article is to demonstrate that the Supreme Court
accurately characterized FERC’s jurisdiction, and to explain the extent
of FERC’s authority under FERC v. EPSA. To that end, the Article uses
a historical approach that examines the evolution of the law over the
past 100 years in three distinct eras: railroad regulation of the early
1900s, where the “practices affecting rates” language originated;
regulation of the electric utility industry under the FPA from 1935
through the industry transition to competition beginning in the 1980s;
and regulation in the modern market era. No analysis to date has
taken such a comprehensive approach to understanding FERC’s
authority, nor aimed to reconcile all of this law. This Article fills this
gap by providing four guiding principles to enable courts and
policymakers to apply the “directly affecting” standard in individual
situations involving FERC’s jurisdiction. Over time, the interpretation
of “practices affecting rates” has traced a distinctive arc, featuring
flexibility about conduct being regulated. Originally, agencies used it
to remedy individual firms’ discriminatory activities — for example,
railroads’ secret preferences.13 Following the FPA’s enactment, the
focal point for defining “practices” shifted to determining how
comprehensively rate-setting tariffs should describe utility
operations.14 Today, as the Court has acknowledged, “practices
affecting rates” means the terms, conditions, and rules that govern
wholesale markets.15 FERC’s role has shifted from overseeing whether
an individual utility harmed customers, to whether market operations
do. Under FERC v. EPSA, this extends FERC’s reach to a wide range of
entities whose conduct affects wholesale rates directly and
significantly.
This Article discusses how FERC v. EPSA’s “directly affecting”
language empowers FERC to regulate those practices that affect
wholesale markets directly and significantly, or are integral to the
markets’ proper functioning. It adds four factors to the Court’s
analysis for courts and policymakers to consider in applying this
standard. This recognizes that FERC’s expansive “practices affecting
rates” authority is well grounded in 100 years of history. While the
transport), and White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(states challenged EPA’s approach to regulating mercury emissions).
12 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775-82 (2016).
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing this body of law).
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing the interpretation of the FPA during this period).
15 See infra Part III (discussing the modern view of FPA provisions).
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“practices” being regulated have changed, the prevailing trend over the
years has been regulatory growth and breadth, not shortcomings and
limits. FERC v. EPSA highlights a resilient statute: the FPA’s terms are
not frozen in amber, as the statute has adapted to changing market
realities. Therefore, the Court has properly confirmed that the FPA
has flexibility to address modern developments in the electric grid.
As a prudential matter, FERC might not advocate certain policies to
transform the electric grid; backlash to some of its reform initiatives
has been severe, prompting agency retrenchment and reticence.16
FERC v. EPSA’s upholding of Order 745 shows that FERC can boldly
pursue policy goals (such as promoting reduced electricity
consumption) going beyond the pursuit of economic efficiency in
wholesale markets. It can even take an “environmental” action — such
as addressing climate change through a carbon adder17 — if it has a
direct relationship to wholesale rates. Moreover, it does not matter
that its initiatives might impinge on state authority. The Supreme
Court has long settled that FERC can act if it does not engage in direct
regulation of matters expressly reserved to the states.18 FERC v. EPSA
reiterated this central principle and held that it did not invalidate
Order 745.19
This confirmation of FERC’s broad authority brings clarity to energy
law federalism. The balance of power between the states and FERC has
been the subject of considerable recent uncertainty. The FPA defines
jurisdiction in terms of separate and exclusive “retail” and “wholesale”
spheres, with a complex matrix of actions regulated either by FERC or

16 See, e.g., DAVID E. MCNABB, PUBLIC UTILITIES: MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 230-31 (2005) (discussing the political opposition to the Standard
Market Design proposal); John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets
and the FERC, 35 ENERGY L.J. 345, 347 (2014); Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely
On Markets to Set Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY L.J. 65, 65-66 (2003) (discussing the
SMD’s features).
17 For a discussion of the features of a carbon adder, see Weissman & Webb, supra
note 1, at 4.
18 See infra Part III.C (discussing cases reaching this conclusion).
19 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 776 (2016):

FERC regulation does not run afoul of § 824(b)’s proscription just because it
affects — even substantially — the quantity or terms of retail sales. It is a
fact of economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in
every other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. To
the contrary, transactions that occur on the wholesale market have natural
consequences at the retail level. And so too, of necessity, will FERC’s
regulation of those wholesale matters.
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by the states.20 In today’s electric power system, electric current flows
across state lines.21 Inevitably, then, jurisdictional tensions have arisen
— even though FERC and the states nominally remain within their
“assigned spheres.”22 This leads some to deem the situation
intractable, calling the FPA’s language drawing sharp jurisdictional
boundaries outmoded.23
As the Court has determined, the “practices affecting rates” language
can alleviate this tension. This conclusion follows from a long line of
judicial decisions on “practices” predating FERC v. EPSA that yield
detailed limits on what FERC and the states can regulate, giving a rich
context to the distinction between “retail” and “wholesale.” The
approach outlined in this Article can go a long way toward deciding
which responsibilities are best assumed by each level of government,
or by both concurrently. This can be accomplished by applying its
limiting principles in a manner that gives sufficient guidance to federal
and state regulators, utilities, and consumers.
Part I examines the FPA’s structure and text, the rise of the
wholesale electricity markets, and the jurisdictional challenges, using
the example of demand response. Part II discusses the Progressive Era
origins of “undue discrimination” and “practices affecting rates” and
their interpretation before the emergence of the modern wholesale
markets. Part III discusses the modern era and the foundation for
interpreting “practices affecting rates” and discrimination comparably,
arguing for and describing the standard that allows FERC to govern
practices directly and significantly affecting wholesale market rates. To
provide guidance to courts and policymakers for handling contentious
cases, Part IV articulates four factors for elaborating on the standard,
and also suggests how to apply the standard in challenging situations
when preemption questions arise.

20 Charts detailing federal, state, and concurrent jurisdiction under the FPA
illustrate this complexity. See Scott Hempling, Electricity Jurisdiction: Actions by
Market Participants, SCOTT HEMPLING L., http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/files/
attachments/elec_jurisdiction_hempling_020514.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
21 This interconnectedness subjects most electricity transmission to federal
regulation under the FPA. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012) (claiming federal jurisdiction
over “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce”); FPC v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 454 (1972) (confirming federal jurisdiction on this basis).
22 See Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 515
n.12 (1989).
23 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 940-41 (stating that, “the federalism boundaries drawn
in 1935 in the FPA may no longer be appropriate in today’s world”).
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THE CORE OF A RESILIENT APPROACH TO THE FPA

Before FERC v. EPSA, talk of the FPA’s resilience and adaptability
seemed inapt, considering its core provisions have not changed
substantially in eighty years. The FPA’s division of authority between
FERC and the states has received the sharpest criticism. The FPA
closed the “Attleboro gap” and addressed the inability of state public
utility commissions (“PUCs”) to regulate large interstate holding
companies,24 giving the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), FERC’s
predecessor, authority over “all wholesale sales in interstate
commerce.”25 It divides authority rigidly between FERC and the states
— FERC regulates at “wholesale” and the states at “retail.”26 The core
jurisdictional provision, section 201, extends federal jurisdiction to
“public utilities”27 engaged in “the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce.”28 FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over
24 The 1927 Supreme Court decision in Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam
& Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927), recognized constitutional limits on states
regulating interstate energy transactions. The Court concluded that neither
Massachusetts nor Rhode Island had the power to regulate an interstate transaction,
and “if such regulation is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power
vested in Congress.” Id. at 90; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002)
(“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal regulation of
electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in
Attleboro, [and] it also extended federal coverage to some areas that previously had
been state regulated.”); Boyd, supra note 1, at 1629-30 (noting that, “[w]hile . . .
holding companies emerged in part to facilitate the building of regional systems, they
also provided a means of escaping rate regulation by states and thus became an object
of intense regulatory scrutiny and concern during the Great Depression as utilities
went bankrupt across the country. In 1935, Congress enacted two statutes to deal with
the increasingly interstate nature of the electricity industry and the abuses of the
holding companies”).
25 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 216 (1964).
26 Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and
Retrenchment in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 549 (2005)
[hereinafter Regulatory Linearity].
27 The Federal Power Act’s definition of a “public utility” is not the same as the
common understanding of a “utility.” The Act defines a “public utility” as “any person
who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” that is,
“any person who owns or operates” facilities for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2012).
28 The FPA granted the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), now FERC,
authority over the rates and conditions for the interstate sale and transmission of
electricity at wholesale (sales before resale to eventual consumers). 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)
(claiming federal jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce”); FPC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 461-63 (1972) (affirming
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wholesale sales of electricity and transmission in interstate commerce;
states have jurisdiction over retail sales.29
Professor Hannah Wiseman calls this bright line “antiquated,”30
arbitrary and unworkable in today’s interconnected, interstate electric
grid.31 Compared to the more dynamic relationship between the states
and the federal government prevalent under other modern regulatory
statutes,32 assigning separate and exclusive regulatory spheres to FERC
and the states appears to reflect “stagnant vestiges” of the long
discarded approach of “dual federalism.”33 Calls for new approaches to
energy law federalism abound.34
That is one story, but there is another that resonates in FERC v.
EPSA: a story of statutory resilience and flexibility that addresses and
settles many core questions. The foundation of this approach is that
interpretations of the FPA’s two central regulatory provisions have
shifted steadily over time to accommodate new developments in the
electric utility industry, and to empower FERC to regulate them.
These two provisions are FPA sections 205 and 206. Section 205
mandates that all wholesale rates must be just and reasonable,35 and
prohibits utilities from granting any “undue prejudice or
disadvantage.” Section 206 announces that if “any rule, regulation,
practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is
FPC jurisdiction on this basis).
29 FERC’s authority is plenary, and extends to all sales in interstate commerce
except those explicitly made subject to regulation by the states. See Gulf States Util.
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).
30 Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid
Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 99 (2015).
31 Id. at 97 (noting that, “[e]lectricity has changed in so many ways since the
passage of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) — a 1935 statute that allocated jurisdiction
over electricity between states and the federal government — that the Act’s division of
state and federal authority is increasingly irrelevant and artificial”).
32 For example, there is a rich body of scholarship on the “cooperative federalism”
approach to environmental law, which implements an interactive relationship between
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the states. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson,
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (discussing
the origins of environmental federalism and the contemporary approach); Emily
Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building
Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2013).
33 Wiseman, supra note 30, at 97.
34 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism,
72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013) (proposing a “novel” approach to the subject).
35 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012). All rates charged by any public utility “in connection
with the . . . sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and
all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges” are required
to be “just and reasonable.” Id.
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unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC
must “determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification,
rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order.”36
The flexible approach to the FPA has several fundamental attributes.
The touchstone for regulatory intervention is remedying anticompetitive “discrimination,” the umbrella term for activities harming
customers of regulated firms. Since the 1900s, regulators have
consistently viewed discrimination in context, focusing on whether
firms’ conduct — “practices” — harms customers, rather than
enumerating specific prohibited practices. The nature of these
“practices” has changed over time. Agencies have interpreted regulated
“practices” broadly, but with some limits, the most significant being a
direct and significant relationship to the rates for service subject to
agency control.
As the electric utility industry has transformed, FERC’s regulatory
approach has as well. In the past several decades, wholesale markets
for electricity have grown and substantially displaced price regulation
of individual firms.37 This transformation began in the 1980s with the
rise of independent power generators and competition to entrenched
utilities.38 It accelerated when FERC issued major orders, Orders
888,39 889,40 and 2000,41 aimed at preventing transmission line owners
from using their monopoly power to prevent others from using the
lines.42 Regional grid operators known as “independent system
36 Id. § 824e(a). Similar language in section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”)
also authorizes FERC jurisdiction to ensure that “practices . . . affecting rates” are just
and reasonable, and the statutes and decisions under them are read in pari materia.
Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 506 (1989)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 717c, 717d).
37 See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 8.
38 Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 549-50 (discussing the impact of
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) on stimulating the growth of
competition to established generators and noting that it “essentially invented a market
for generation where none previously existed”).
39 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (1996).
40 Open-Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1996).
41 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2000).
42 Order 888 operated on a principle of comparability: the belief that owners of
the transmission grid should offer third parties access to the grid on the same or
comparable terms and conditions as the transmission owner’s own use of the system.
See Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 550-51; infra Part III.B.
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operators” (“ISOs”) and “regional transmission organizations”
(“RTOs”)43 now administer several different types of wholesale
markets for electricity,44 under FERC oversight, and seven ISO/RTOs45
now serve over one-half of the nation and provide two-thirds of the
nation’s electricity.46 This is far different from the system that
prevailed for decades after the FPA’s enactment. Then, vertically
integrated investor-owned utilities dominated the industry, providing
monopoly service to their customers by generating, transmitting and
supplying power to their customers, with little need for wholesale
power transactions.47
In the market-based system, the lens through which FERC views its
oversight role has broadened to an industry-wide focus. As it did for
“undue discrimination,” the Court has now confirmed that FERC can
control “practices” on an industry-wide basis, with appropriate limits.

43 Order 888 encouraged (but did not require) the formation of regional
Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) to help manage the provision of transmission
services and oversee wholesale power markets. 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (establishing
requirements for ISOs). Order 2000 continued this transformation by encouraging
RTOs’ formation and setting forth specific requirements for an entity to qualify as an
RTO. 18 C.F.R. pt. 35; Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 551-52.
44 ISO/RTOs manage energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets. Energy
markets are designed to ensure that enough generation plants are online and able to
produce electricity on a day-ahead to one-hour-ahead basis. JAQUELIN COCHRAN ET AL.,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., MARKET EVOLUTION: WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET
DESIGN FOR 21ST CENTURY POWER SYSTEMS, at vi-vii (2013), available at http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/57477.pdf. Ancillary services markets allow the ISO/RTO to
maintain a portfolio of backup generation in case of unexpectedly high demand or if
contingencies arise. Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,”
and the Smart Grid, 7 HOUS. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 203 (2012)
(discussing “regulation” and the potential for demand response to participate in
ancillary services markets). Forward capacity markets aim for resource “adequacy”: to
ensure that there is sufficient generating capacity over the long term to meet projected
demand, by providing financial incentives for suppliers to keep generating plants
online and to induce new investment in generation. COCHRAN ET AL., supra, at vi.
45 The difference between RTO and ISO is today largely semantic, and this Article
will use the term “ISO/RTO” to encompass the two. See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 589 (2005) (discussing comparable ISO and RTO governance models).
46 See Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 551; Electric Power Markets:
National Overview, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/marketoversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last updated Dec. 21, 2015); The Role of ISOs and
RTOs, ISO/RTO COUNCIL, http://www.isorto.org/about/Role (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
47 See Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 549-50 (noting the lack of a
wholesale market before the 1990s); Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 150;
Hoecker & Smith, supra note 8, at 75.
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Yet as FERC v. EPSA observed,48 “practices” has a broad meaning: a
practice is “how a company does business,” a “method, procedure,
process, or rule employed or followed by a company in the pursuit of
its objectives.”49 Electricity is a universal commodity, and nearly every
business “practice” has a connection to it. Building a shoe
manufacturing plant in Massachusetts affects how much electricity is
needed on the New England electric grid, but it would be serious
overreaching for FERC to assert responsibility for issuing the plant’s
building permit. “Practices” can undoubtedly have many meanings,
and FERC cannot use its breadth to regulate activities unconnected to
the markets.
Fortunately, limits on FERC’s authority over “practices affecting
rates” have been defined in appellate court cases and now confirmed
by the Court. Demand response — payments to consumers to reduce
electricity consumption — was an excellent candidate to be this issue’s
acid test. Demand response is not a new invention,50 as it has been
around for decades. In its present form, FERC is allowing
intermediaries51 to bid demand reductions into the wholesale
electricity markets it controls as the equivalent of energy or capacity
(the ability to provide energy when called upon). “By pulling together
demand reductions from a number of retail customers, an aggregator
enables individual customers to take part in the market when they
otherwise could not do so.”52
What made demand response in the wholesale markets contentious
is not what it is so much as what it is not. It forced a judgment about
whether markets should trade something other than commodity
energy. Demand response providers are not “public utilities” under

48

FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).
Business Practice, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/
definition/business-practice.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
50 Eric Hirst, Price-Responsive Demand in Wholesale Markets: Why Is So Little
Happening?, 14 ELECTRICITY J. 25, 26-27 (2001). Utilities began demand reduction
programs known as “curtailment” and “peak shaving” in the 1980s and 1990s. Jon
Wellinghoff & David E. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: The
Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 394 (2007).
51 FERC’s Order 745 applies only to demand response bid into wholesale energy
markets by intermediaries known as “aggregators” or “curtailment service
provider[s]” (“CSPs”). Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011).
52 “Most residential customers cannot interact directly with the wholesale
markets, as market rules in RTOs and ISOs” require bidders to offer a minimum
amount of energy, which forces small-scale customers to bid through CSPs. Eisen,
Who Regulates The Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 81.
49
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the FPA,53 so allowing FERC to control them appeared to expand its
reach beyond jurisdictional entities. Moreover, demand response is
not merely a wholesale market resource, because in its aggregated
form it represents the sum of numerous consumption reduction
decisions. Looked at one way, demand response is the bidding of a
resource into wholesale markets. From another, the consumption
reductions can affect retail rates, which states set. As FERC put it
delicately, jurisdiction over “demand response is a complex matter
that lies at the confluence of state and federal jurisdiction.”54
Opponents raised other policy objections, viewing demand response in
wholesale markets as inferior to true marginal cost pricing of
electricity.55 Unfortunately, the electricity industry, unlike most
others, does not have “dynamic pricing,”56 which has not been
implemented to any great degree.57
FERC justified Order 745 (which required aggregators bundling
demand reductions and bidding them into wholesale energy markets
to be paid the same market price as generators58) and related agency
53 Demand response providers do not own or operate “facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.” The FPA’s definition of a jurisdictional “public
utility,” see supra note 27, is not the same as the common understanding of a “utility.”
The Act defines a “public utility” as “any person who owns or operates facilities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” that is, “any person who owns or
operates” facilities for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and
to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824(e)
(2012). Demand response providers do not satisfy this test.
54 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d
and remanded FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (quoting
Order 745).
55 James Bushnell et al., When It Comes To Demand Response, Is FERC Its Own
Worst Enemy?, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 9, 10 (2009) (claiming that demand response
programs “threaten to crowd out far superior approaches”).
56 Id. at 11.
57 In 2014, only about one percent of American residential consumers were using
any form of dynamic pricing rates. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 2014 ASSESSMENT OF
DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING, STAFF REPORT 31 (2014), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/demand-response.pdf; see Paul L. Joskow
& Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 38384 (2012) (discussing the slow adoption of dynamic pricing); Matthew L. Wald, Power
Savings of Smart Meters Prove Slow to Materialize, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/business/energy-environment/power-savings-ofsmart-meters-prove-slow-to-materialize.html.
58 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,
Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011); Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart
Grid?, supra note 3, at 75. Demand response providers are only compensated when it
is cost effective to do so, under a “net-benefits test” developed by each ISO/RTO.
Pierce, Demand Response, supra note 4.
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proceedings59 on the pillars of its FPA authority: the power to decide
just and reasonable rates, and the power to remedy discriminatory
practices affecting wholesale rates.60 Its stated purpose was to propose
“a remedy to concerns that current compensation levels inhibited
meaningful demand-side participation.”61 FERC judged that while
demand response is not energy, it compares to it because it has
numerous benefits for energy markets, such as improved reliability,
reduced consumption, and reductions in carbon emissions.62
This looked to some like a power grab, and sparked considerable
tension between FERC and its opponents (organizations representing
generators, and some states). The D.C. Circuit’s EPSA decision held
that demand response was solely a retail-level activity, that FERC had
no authority over it, and that giving FERC jurisdiction over demand
response would have no boundaries; if Order 745 stood, FERC could
regulate the steel and labor markets if it so chose.63 In the wake of the
D.C. Circuit’s EPSA decision, there was considerable uncertainty about
demand response participation in wholesale markets. Some believed
that FERC had overreached and can only promote electric grid
innovation with new or revamped statutory authority.64
59 Order 745 built on the foundation of FERC’s Order 719, which required ISOs
and RTOs to revise their tariffs and allow demand response aggregator participation in
the wholesale markets. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric
Markets, Order 719, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2008) [hereinafter Order 719].
60 134 FERC ¶ 61,187, para. 112; see also Order Conditionally Granting MarketBased Rate Authorization and Providing Guidance, 130 FERC ¶ 61,031, para. 32
(2010) (stating that FERC was construing demand response as a “practice that affects
rates” in holding that EnergyConnect, a demand response provider, was subject to
FERC jurisdiction); Order Assessing Civil Penalty, 144 FERC ¶ 61,164, para. 71
(2013) (holding that an individual’s fraudulent conduct in the ISO-New England
demand response market was jurisdictional, using the same rationale).
61 134 FERC ¶ 61,187, para. 1. At one point, FERC had attempted to regulate
demand response as a “sale” under FPA section 201, but by 2011, recognizing that no
electricity was actually being sold, it had reversed its position. Order Conditionally
Granting Market-Based Rate Authorization and Providing Guidance, 130 FERC ¶
61,031, para. 31 (2010).
62 Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 71 (mentioning
improved reliability and environmental impacts such as the reduced need to run
polluting power plants).
63 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d
and remanded FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). In an article
published in 2007, several years before Order 745’s issuance and well before the EPSA
decision, former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff anticipated and refuted this
slippery slope argument, referring to some of the case law discussed infra Part III.
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 50, at 404.
64 See generally Jacobs, supra note 2 (terming Order 745 “bypassing federalism”).
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A close look at the law developed over the past 100 years supports
the Court’s reading of the FPA. The Supreme Court’s broad reading of
“practices affecting rates” that empowers FERC to regulate demand
response and other matters directly affecting the wholesale markets is
no radical departure from the statutory text. To the contrary, it is a
logical — and inescapable — conclusion from the lessons of a body of
law developed over the past century. FERC v. EPSA is consistent with
the focus on firms’ conduct that has undergirded the approach to
controlling regulated industries, demonstrating the regulatory
structure’s continuing adaptability. As the Court has now
acknowledged, the statutory mandate continues unchanged, but has
adapted to suit market realities.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN AUTHORITY: “UNDUE
DISCRIMINATION” AND “PRACTICES AFFECTING RATES” FROM THE
RAILROAD ERA TO THE DAWN OF ELECTRIC INDUSTRY COMPETITION
The origins of FERC’s authority date to the Progressive Era. The
“practices affecting rates” language originated in the 1906 Hepburn
Act, a railroad regulation law that added section 15 to the Interstate
Commerce Act (“ICA”),65 the forerunner of FPA section 20566 and
nearly identical provisions in other regulatory statutes. After
discussing that era, this Part turns to the time period beginning with
the FPA’s 1935 enactment, spanning the period of regulation of
vertically integrated utilities to the rise of industry competition in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The final time period, discussed in the
next Part, continues from there to the present day. Only after looking
at all three can we arrive at a full picture of the modern view of
“undue discrimination” and “practices affecting rates.”
A. Addressing Discriminatory Practices in Progressive Era Railroad
Regulation
Federal railroad laws created a regulatory juggernaut with strong
federal powers. These statutes included the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 (“ICA”), which established the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”), and three Progressive Era statutes that
strengthened it: the Elkins Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act, and the
65

Hepburn Act of 1906 § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589-90, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (repealed 1978).
Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S.
45, 49 (2007) (noting that provisions of the Communications Act are nearly identical
as well); Joshua Z. Rokach, FERC’s Jurisdiction Under Section 205 of the Federal Power
Act, 15 ENERGY L.J. 83, 83 (1994).
66
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Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.67 This government-administered scheme of
regulation is now long gone from the national landscape, but the
Hepburn Act and cases decided after its enactment developed two
fundamental attributes of the “practices affecting rates” language. The
first was that federal agencies could take action against a wide variety
of discriminatory practices of regulated firms. The second was that
statutes gave agencies broad discretion, but that discretion had limits.
The ICA represented a shift from the common law approach to
regulation of common carriers.68 At common law, common carriers69
have a “duty to serve”: they must carry all traffic, or face legal action
for refusing to do so. As early as the 17th century, common carrier
rates were required to be “reasonable.” This followed from the duty to
serve, as a common carrier could not pick and choose customers by
quoting much higher rates to some customers than to those similarly
situated.70 However, the “reasonableness” requirement was ineffective
in preventing rate discrimination, due to proof problems and other
weaknesses.71
“Reasonable” railroad rates were never uniform. Indeed, basic
economics of 19th and 20th century railroad operation virtually
dictated non-uniformity,72 and so the ICA’s response was the lodestar
67 See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 539; Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 584;
Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847 (1903); Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379. See
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988) (discussing railroad regulation laws).
68 Thomas W. Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, Administered Contracts, and the
Illusion of Comprehensive Regulation, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42 (2012)
[hereinafter The Interstate Commerce Act] (noting the ICA’s institution of differences
between ordinary contracts governing transportation in the common law regime, and
tariffs in the statutory, administrative regime).
69 “Common carrier” is the well-known term that refers to those entities that hold
themselves out to the public to carry goods or persons for hire, as distinguished from
“private carriers.” AM. COMMERCE ASS’N, LAW OF COMMON CARRIERS, ABRIDGED 1-5
(1918). Railroads were incorporated under state statutes, making them common
carriers. Id. at 17.
70 DEWITT CLINTON MOORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS 160-61 (1914); J.
Walter Lord, A Brief Review of the Subject of Federal Railroad Regulation, 181 N. AM.
REV. 754, 755 (1905).
71 See Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 1046; Lord, supra note 70, at 755.
72 EMORY RICHARD JOHNSON & THURMAN WILLIAM VAN METRE, PRINCIPLES OF
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 338-40 (1921) (discussing the reasons for differing railroad
rates over different distances in depth); Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 1035-37
(explaining this phenomenon); see also Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy
Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line,
___ N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with author)
(observing that two different markets developed and states facilitated discrimination
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of “unjust” and “unreasonable” rates.73 Under the ICA, the agency
could redress rates varying too dramatically from those offered to
similar shippers in similar circumstances, without the procedural
barriers of common law actions.74
1.

Remedying Discrimination: The Hepburn Act

Besides excessive rate differentials, unlawful discrimination by
railroads was understood at the time to include excessive rate
differences and other preferences — railroad pooling, secret rebates,
and drawbacks.75 Pools — cartels in which railroad members divided
traffic and revenues among themselves — were not universally viewed
as evil; indeed, they had been the subject of “a great debate waged
among railroad economists and policymakers over whether [they] . . .
should be legal.”76 The ICA prohibited pooling, but by the early 1900s
the practice had not completely diminished. Other practices, including
drawbacks (rebates to favored shippers, plus rebates on rates paid by
all other shippers)77 and rebates were widely criticized as

in the short-haul market).
73 See G. Edward White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy
of Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L.J. 195, 199-200, 202 (discussing the political
development of the “just and reasonable” rate standard in the Hepburn Act).
74 James B. Speta, Supervising Discrimination: Reflections of the Interstate Commerce
Act in the Broadband Debate, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2012) (“‘[T]he core
concern in the nondiscrimination area has been to maintain equality of pricing for
shipments subject to substantially similar costs and competitive conditions, while
permitting carriers to introduce differential pricing where dissimilarities in those key
variables exist.’” (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
1984))).
75 There is an extensive literature on these unfair practices, much of it discussing
the use of these practices by John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, but also
referring to the practices as engaged in by other railroads. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1911); IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD
OIL COMPANY (1904); CHARLES RICHARD VAN HISE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL: A
SOLUTION OF THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (1921); DANIEL YERGIN, THE
PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 39 (1991) (discussing Standard Oil’s
controversial use of rebates and drawbacks); Lord, supra note 70; Michael Reksulak &
William F. Shughart II, Of Rebates and Drawbacks: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Company
and the Railroads, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG., 267, 280-81 (2011).
76 Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 1039-40 (noting that prominent economists and
lawyers argued that pooling was essential to the railroads’ survival).
77 YERGIN, supra note 75, at 39; Reksulak & Shughart II, supra note 75, at 280-81
(describing Standard Oil’s drawback practices). For an interesting argument that
drawbacks were actually justified, see generally Daniel A. Crane, Were Standard Oil’s
Railroad Rebates and Drawbacks Cost Justified?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2012).
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anticompetitive.78 Rebates came in several different forms, including
“personal” discrimination (rebates to large shippers in exchange for
their business) and rebates extended by vertically integrated railroads
to their own parent or subsidiary firms.79 Another activity viewed as
problematic was abuse relating to private railroad cars.80 Railroads did
not keep a permanent supply of cars needed for shippers’ use.
Independent companies kept them and provided them as necessary.81
These firms faced no federal regulation, so problems arose, ranging
from simple extortion to allotments of cars that favored some shippers
over others, to secret rebates on private car charges.82
Opposition to secret preferences was a strong driver of federal
regulation. The Elkins Act strengthened the ICA by ending rebates,83
but this was ineffective to end their pervasiveness, because the ICC
lacked enforcement power.84 The result of a contentious
Congressional debate and forceful personal advocacy by President
Roosevelt for more federal power85 was the 1906 Hepburn Act. That
law contained versions of three types of power that became common
to regulatory agencies: power to set maximum — though not
minimum — rates under the “just and reasonable” standard;86 power
78 Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 1046 (noting that railroads’ preferences were
opposed by “[n]early every person who wrote about railroads in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century”).
79 Id. at 1047; Reksulak & Shughart II, supra note 75, at 280-81.
80 A 1905 article listed “private-car abuse” as one of three railroad “evils alleged by
the shipping public to be prevalent, and which call for correction,” the other two
being “extortionate rates” and “[rate] discrimination.” Lord, supra note 70, at 754.
81 An example was refrigerated cars to ship perishable crops, which the railroads
needed only seasonally. Id. at 763-64.
82 In his 1905 State of the Union Message, President Roosevelt blasted the abuses
of the private car system, calling them “pernicious.” Theodore Roosevelt’s Fifth Annual
Message, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 5, 1905), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=29546&st=theodore+roosevelt&st1=.
83 Elkins Act § 1, 32 Stat. 847, 847-48 (1903).
84 James W. Ely Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2012).
85 Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 955-58 (2011)
[hereinafter Article III] (discussing the debate over the Hepburn Act and President
Roosevelt’s involvement); see Theodore Roosevelt: Domestic Affairs, MILLER CENTER FOR
AM. PRESIDENT, http://millercenter.org/president/biography/roosevelt-domestic-affairs
(last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
86 Section 1 of the Hepburn Act provided that, “All charges made for any service
rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as
aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or
handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and
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to judge whether rates were just and reasonable (taking it from the
courts, which retained power to review the ICC’s rate decisions),87 and
power to end discriminatory practices. On this third point, ICA
section 15, added by the Hepburn Act, provided:
That the Commission is authorized and empowered, and it
shall be its duty, whenever, after full hearing . . . it shall be of
the opinion that any . . . regulations or practices whatsoever of
such carrier or carriers affecting such rates, are unjust or
unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of any of
the provisions of this Act, to determine and prescribe what . . .
regulation or practice in respect to such transportation is just,
fair, and reasonable to be thereafter followed.88
The Congressional debate over the Hepburn Act reflected
considerable interest in using this provision to stop specific unlawful
practices. For example, Congressman Clayton observed that the new
Act “will go far toward preventing secret practices, preferences, rebates,
and the like, which have been so difficult to deal with, and which have
really resulted in building up immense fortunes in the hands of those
favored by such practices, preferences, rebates, and the like.”89
The primary mechanism for combating discrimination was the
published tariff, which announced a carrier’s terms and conditions of
service.90 The tariff was far more than a simple rate schedule. As
Thomas Merrill has explained, a tariff is an “administrative contract”91
— a list of terms and conditions a firm submits and a regulatory
agency approves. Announcing core policies and services ensures that
all customers receive service under the tariff’s terms and conditions,
(in theory) protecting them from discrimination.92 Courts held that
unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.”
Hepburn Act of 1906 § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584-86; CLARENCE A. MILLER, THE LEGISLATIVE
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 140 (1930); see generally 1 WILLIAM J.
KNORST, INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAW AND PRACTICE 51-200 (1st ed. 1953).
87 Hepburn Act § 5, 34 Stat. at 590-92; see Merrill, Article III, supra note 85, at 965
(noting that the design of that provision presaged modern judicial review of agency
decisions).
88 Hepburn Act § 4, 34 Stat. at 589-90.
89 40 CONG. REC. 1996 (1906). Similarly, Congressman Esch decried abuses of the
private car system. 40 CONG. REC. 2004 (1906).
90 N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906).
91 Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, supra note 68, at 1142.
92 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1994); see also
id. at 1145.
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providing service without a tariff, failing to file and publish a tariff
before providing service, or deviating from an approved tariff, violated
the ICA.93 This made secret preferences and other discrimination more
difficult to implement, but did not completely end them.94 For
example, carriers quickly learned to file tariffs that offered different
rates to different shippers, based on competitive circumstances.
2.

Judicial Construction in the Pre-New Deal Era

Almost immediately, courts were called upon to interpret ICA
section 15, with several cases reaching the Supreme Court. These cases
are hardly fusty relics of history, as they are often cited today. They
settled important principles later enshrined in the FPA and that are
still vital today: regulators have broad authority to remedy
discrimination; discrimination refers to unlawful preferences or
advantages; and “practices” must be construed broadly, with some
limits, to enable regulators to reach a wide range of activities.95
The first major case, ICC v. Illinois Central Railroad,96 settled that
the ICC could use its anti-discrimination mandate to remedy railroads’
unlawful preferences, and that this mandate gave the ICC broad power
over more behavior than the railroad evils originally identified as
problematic. The case involved the ICA’s requirement that a railroad
have suitable rail cars to transport goods whenever reasonably
demanded by a shipper. A railroad was only bound to provide cars as
it might reasonably be expected to have in the ordinary course of its
business.97 If it did not have enough, it would choose how to allocate
them. Could the ICC issue an order forcing a different distribution?
The ICC issued just such an order,98 and the Supreme Court upheld
it, rejecting the railroad’s argument that the ICC had no power to
93

Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, supra note 68, at 1145.
Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission:
The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 1151, 1164 (2012) (noting that unlawful practices persisted after the Elkins
and Hepburn Acts).
95 Cases decided under the ICA have relevance in FPA cases, due to the settled
principle of statutory construction that “where provisions of one statute have been
adopted by another, the interpretation which has been authoritatively placed upon the
former applies to the latter also.” Hope Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 196 F.2d 803, 807
(4th Cir. 1952); cf. Ivy Broad. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d
Cir. 1968) (observing that ICA cases retain their importance under the
Communications Act).
96 ICC v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452 (1910).
97 MOORE, supra note 70, at 67-68.
98 Ill. Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. at 464-65.
94
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compel a particular distribution. To hold otherwise, the Court stated,
“would require us to hold that Congress, in enlarging the power of the
[c]ommission over rates, had so drafted the amendment as to cripple
and paralyze its power in correcting abuses as to preferences and
discriminations which, as this court has hitherto pointed out, it was
the great and fundamental purpose of Congress to further.”99 “Abuses”
of any sort were within the ICC’s purview to address.
The second major case, 1916’s United States v. Pennsylvania Railroad,
the so-called “Tank Car Case,”100 involved the railroad’s responsibility
(if any) to procure private cars for its shippers. Two oil companies
sought to have the ICC force the Pennsylvania Railroad to provide
them tank cars for shipping oil.101 Tank cars were a significant
improvement over barrel shipping, allowing for larger oil shipments at
lower per-unit rates.102 At the time, however, the vast majority of oil
tank cars were in private hands,103 and the Pennsylvania Railroad
owned less than 3% of the national total.104
The ICC ordered the railroad to furnish cars to the two companies.
A lower court reversed the order, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice McKenna discussed at length the claim that the refusal to
provide private cars was a “practice.” The Court observed that the
Hepburn Act had not defined the “practices ‘affecting [such] rates’”
language.105 It was up to the Court to bring clarity, but the language
that came next was anything but clear:
Let us test the contention and see where it takes us. The
request was for a special facility, a combination of package and
car, and the question, then, is whether the neglect to provide it
or to furnish it was a ‘practice’ within the meaning of § 15. The
far-reaching effect of an affirmative answer is instantly
apparent, and there must be hesitation to declare it from the

99

Id. at 477.
United States v. Pa. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 208 (1916).
101 See id. at 219-20.
102 See id. at 211.
103 A Congressional report several years after the Tank Car Case, discussing
subsequent legislative developments, called the inadequacy of private cars “notorious,”
and stated that, “[f]or years the increase in the equipment of the carriers had lagged
behind the increase in the total demand for equipment.” Railroad Revenues and Expenses:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 67th Cong. 2601 (1922).
104 Pa. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. at 231 (restating the ICC’s conclusions of facts that the
Pennsylvania Railroad owned less than 1,000 cars, and all other railroads east of the
Mississippi owned 303, while the total nationwide was over 40,000).
105 Id. at 228.
100
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use of so inapt a word as ‘practice.’ Following a well-known
rule of construction, we must rather suppose its association
was intended to confine it to acts or conduct having the same
purpose as its associates. And there were many such acts for
which the word could provide, — practices which confused
the relation of shippers and carriers, burdened transportation,
favored the large shipper, and oppressed the small one. These
have illustrations in decisions of the Commission. And this
was purpose enough, remedied all that was deemed evil in
privately owned cars of any type. Beyond that it was not
necessary to go; beyond that there were serious impediments
to going; and we cannot but believe that if beyond that it was
intended to go, there would have been explicit declaration of
the intent, with such provision as to notice and time and
preparation as its consequences would demand; not ambushed
in obscurity and suddenly disclosed by construction to turn
accepted custom into delinquency, — a construction that
could be disputed and was disputed.106
In other words, the Supreme Court would not use the antidiscrimination mandate to compel railroads to purchase private cars.
This would have created a virtually unlimited responsibility, expanding
railroads’ obligations well beyond the needs of two oil companies
shipping in western Pennsylvania.107 Moreover, to require shippers to
provide for their own private cars was not discrimination, as that was
understood at the time. The railroad was not choosing among shippers,
for example, by buying cars for some and not for others.
Nearly 100 years later, some courts saw only limitations in this
language to a broad construction of “practices” (“[b]eyond that it was
not necessary to go,” “serious impediments,” a construction
“ambushed in obscurity and suddenly disclosed”).108 Viewing the
holding in context, however, it is neither surprising nor much of a
limit on “practices.” Indeed, what the Court did not do is more
important today than its precise holding about tank cars. Justice
McKenna did not alter or constrain the ICC’s general statutory
authority to remedy a broad range of practices. He confirmed it: the

106

Id. at 229.
The Court stated, “[i]f there be a duty [to provide private cars], it would seem
necessarily to be universal. And such contention is growing.” Id. at 229.
108 See infra notes 219–33 and accompanying text (discussion of Tank Car Case as
limiting FERC’s authority, in the California Independent System Operator case).
107
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ICC could remedy “many such acts” of discrimination.109 Practices
were activities favoring one group of shippers over another unjustly;
in the archaic usage “confused the relation,” “relation” meant
“relationship.”110 The ICA did not define “practices” and “affecting,”
and the fact that “many such acts” could be discriminatory
demonstrated the terms’ breadth and flexibility.
The core function of section 15 regulation was to control
discriminatory practices favoring one group of shippers over another.
That principle, not the specific holding about the private car system, is
the Tank Car Case’s most important contribution to modern law.
Consider how the case was remembered in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States, a lower court decision two decades later that
summarized the meaning of “practices affecting rates” in the 1940s
(that is, just after the FPA’s enactment) as follows: “‘practice’ as
employed in the statute cannot have a meaning co-extensive with any
exigency deemed to exist, or elastic enough to embrace everything a
carrier may do [but] it does embrace those things that affect arbitrarily
and unreasonably the purse of the shipper.”111
Consistent with this interpretation, discriminatory practices in this
era were individual railroads’ actions giving undue preferences to
specific shippers. “Practices” included specific evils (rebates, pools,
and drawbacks) and other preferences. To ascertain whether practices
were unlawful, the agency would measure conduct against terms and
conditions listed in a tariff. Discrimination conducted in “secret,” of
course, was illegal. Otherwise, discrimination was viewed
contextually.112 The mere existence of differential treatment was not
sufficient per se to establish discrimination. Each practice would be
examined in terms of whether the railroad was recovering its costs,
and whether those costs were imposed arbitrarily and unreasonably on
specific customers.113 Facts could be presented to justify specific
differentials that on their face appeared improper. Also, if a railroad
did not favor one class of shippers over another (as in the Tank Car
Case, with no allegations that the railroad was buying cars for some

109

Pa. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. at 229.
For an earlier example of this usage, see 3 THE SCOTTISH MAGAZINE, AND
CHURCHMAN’S REVIEW 591 (Edinburgh: R. Lendrum & Co., 1854), noting that Martin
Luther “confused the relation of the two parts of the sacrament.”
111 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D. Minn. 1941), aff’d,
316 U.S. 346 (1942).
112 Speta, supra note 74, at 1200.
113 See id. at 1198-200.
110
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shippers and not for others), its activities would not be termed
discriminatory.
However, courts imposed limits on the application of the antidiscrimination mandate. A relationship to jurisdictional rates was
important. Thus, in the 1931 case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Norwood,114 the Supreme Court held that the ICA’s “practices affecting
rates” language did not give the ICC the authority to regulate the
number of men to be employed in crews, declining to consider a
carrier’s employment decisions “practices.” A practice must be
“connect[ed] with the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of
service to be rendered[.]”115
B. “Discrimination” and “Practices Affecting Rates” from the FPA’s
Enactment Through the Rise of Competition and Modern Markets
The law developed under the ICA created the foundation for the
FPA. Congress modeled the FPA on the ICA,116 carrying its language
forward almost verbatim117 to form the core of FERC’s authority to
regulate wholesale transactions. The FPA copied the ICA’s rate-setting
provisions,118 just and reasonable standard for wholesale rates,119 and
prohibitions on discrimination or granting any “undue prejudice or
disadvantage.”
Two of the FPA’s core sections mention “practice” or “practices.”
The first is section 205, where the FPA continued the tariff
requirement. For the first several decades of regulation under the FPA,
the primary instrument of regulation, as under the ICA, was a firmspecific tariff filing.120 FPA section 205(a) requires public utilities (as
defined in the statute) to file tariffs setting forth schedules of rates and
charges. Section 205(a) requires a jurisdictional utility to submit its
114

Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931), modified, 283 U.S. 809 (1931).
Id. at 257.
116 See Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Mont. Dakota Util. Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir.
1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
117 Congress incorporated nearly identical language in other New Deal-era statutes.
Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, supra note 68, at 1145-46. These statutes
included the Communications Act of 1934, the Motor Carrier Act (which regulated
trucking), and the Natural Gas Act (which regulated the interstate natural gas
industry). The ICA, as amended by the 1920 Transportation Act, continued to
regulate railroads.
118 See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 142 (2012).
119 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012).
120 Cf. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994) (filing of
tariffs was “the centerpiece” of the Communications Act’s regulatory scheme).
115
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rates to FERC, and section 205(c) imposes other, more extensive filing
requirements for “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting
such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any
manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and
services.”121
The second mention is in FPA section 206(a), which mirrored ICA
section 15. As noted above, it provides a mandate for FERC to remedy
a practice it finds “unjust” or “unreasonable”: if “any rule, regulation,
practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC
must “determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification,
rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order.”122
This section analyzes the application of these provisions up to the
beginning of the modern, market-based era. It begins with a discussion
of the construction of “undue discrimination” in the first several
decades after the FPA’s enactment, noting its similarity to agency
interpretation under the ICA. It then turns to evaluate a divergence in
the interpretation of “practices affecting rates”: the evolving use of
“practices” to refer to the terms and conditions of a utility’s tariff,
rather than specific discriminatory practices, and the use of the FPA’s
filing requirement to fix the extent of FERC’s authority.
1.

Agency and Judicial Construction of “Undue Discrimination”
After the FPA’s Enactment

For decades after the FPA’s enactment, the FPC interpreted section
206 much as the ICC had remedied railroad discrimination. This need
not have been the case. The electric industry’s economics, and the
circumstances under which federal regulation began, were different
from those of the railroads. As Professor Merrill explains, the
administrative contract “got its start in an industry characterized by a
mixture of competitive and monopolistic routes, where differential
pricing (i.e., ‘discrimination’) was rampant, [but] it proved to be
equally
popular
in
industries
with
natural
monopoly
characteristics . . . .”123 As noted above, the FPA aimed to close the
Attleboro gap and provide for national regulation of the utility
industry, not to remedy specific discriminatory practices. There was
no indication that the anti-discrimination mandate should change to
121
122
123

16 U.S.C. § 824d(c).
Id.
Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, supra note 68, at 1146.
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suit the differences between industries, and the statutory structure was
simply carried over intact. Giving FPC broad anti-discrimination
powers suggests these provisions had worked well up to this point,
and the inclusion of nearly identical language in other New Deal-era
regulatory statutes further supports this view.124
Judicial standards for defining and addressing discrimination carried
over to the utility setting, and ICA precedents were routinely cited in
utility cases.125 “Undue discrimination,” in an industry of vertically
integrated utilities facing no competition, meant unlawful differences
in rates, terms, and conditions by individual utilities among their
customers. This test looked to the tariff to ensure that the utility
provided like rates, terms, and conditions of service to similarly
situated customers.126 Utilities could not favor a class of customers,
unless specific factual differences justified different rates or terms and
conditions of electricity service.127 As in the case of the railroads, the
FPC conducted fact-specific inquiries in individual cases.
As under the ICA, “undue” or “unreasonable” discrimination was
prohibited, but not all rate differences. If “the record exhibit[ed]
factual differences to justify . . . differences among the rates

124 Examples of this are found in communications and airlines regulation. The
Communications Act of 1934 removed regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio
industries from the ICC (which received some authority under the Mann-Elkins Act),
and gave it to the new Federal Communications Commission. See Essential Commc’ns
Sys. Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1117-19 (3d Cir. 1979) (detailing
early regulation of telecommunication and railroad industries); STUART N. BROTMAN,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01[2] (1995 ed.) (describing powers given to
the ICC to regulate telephone and telegraph services under the Mann-Elkins Act).
Section 201(b) of the Communications Act incorporated the “practices affecting
rates” language, empowering the FCC to prohibit an “unjust” or “unreasonable”
practice. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v.
Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 58 (2007).
The Civil Aviation Act of 1938 and subsequent Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Pub.
L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958)) regulated the airlines through regulatory tariffs;
section 1002(d) of the latter statute (now repealed) incorporated the “practices
affecting rates” language.
125 See, e.g., St. Michaels Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 377 F.2d 912, 915
(4th Cir. 1967) (citing five cases decided under the ICA).
126 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1978).
127 New Eng. Power Pool, 67 FERC ¶ 61,042, 61,132 (1994); St. Michaels Utils.
Comm’n, 377 F.2d at 915; cf. Eisman v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 336 F. Supp. 543,
546 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (concluding, in a case involving the propriety of student and
youth air fares, that the Civil Aeronautics Board could make fact-specific inquiries as
to whether differences in fares for the different classes of travelers were warranted
under that standard).
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charged,”128 courts would not upset FERC’s findings that utilities’ rate
differences were justified. A typical case holding that no
discrimination existed under FPA section 206 despite differences in
rates was St. Michaels Utilities Commission v. FPC,129 a 1967 Fourth
Circuit case upholding a utility’s difference in charges to two different
classes of customers. This construction of “discrimination” looked no
different from that of the early railroad cases.
2.

Post-FPA Changes in “Practices Affecting Rates”

While the original understanding of discriminatory conduct carried
over to the FPA setting, the interpretation of “practices” evolved from
its original meaning of addressing discriminatory activities. In judicial
decisions and agency interpretations, the focal point for defining
practices shifted to interpreting section 205(c)’s filing requirement. As
Justice Breyer observed in the 2007 Global Crossing
Telecommunications v. Metrophones Telecommunications decision about
the Communications Act’s nearly identical provision, “the word
‘practice’ in [Communications Act] § 201(b) traditionally applied to a
carrier practice that (unlike the present one) is the subject of a carrier
tariff — i.e., a carrier agency filing that sets forth the carrier’s rates,
classifications, and practices.”130 The FPC — and other agencies using
provisions derived from the ICA — reasoned that filing standard
practices or procedures in a tariff furthered the anti-discrimination
purpose.
The few reported decisions in the post-New Deal decades that
interpreted the “practices affecting rates” language reflected a contract
interpretation theme, as courts grappled with how much detail tariffs
should contain. “Practices” were the core of the utility-customer
relationship. So did everything have to be spelled out in detail, or
could some utility conduct be inferred? Specifying terms and
conditions with less precision might threaten the level playing field on
which consumers received service. However, if utilities had to spell
out their activities in too much detail, it might burden them

128

Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 575 F.2d at 1211.
Alabama Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring
FERC to grant cooperative customers an opportunity to prove dissimilarity where the
same rates charged by utility to cooperative and municipal customers produced
different rates of return); St. Michaels Utils. Comm’n, 377 F.2d at 912; Portland Gen.
Exch., Inc., 51 FERC ¶ 61,108, 61,245 n.62 (1990).
130 Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S.
45, 57 (2007).
129
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excessively: did a regulator really need to know how many office staff
a utility employed?
FPC’s approach was a case-by-case inquiry it called the “rule of
reason.”131 It did not insist that tariffs describe all “routine” utility
practices, but balanced the benefits to consumers against the burdens
on utilities of filing procedures, policies, or practices. An often-quoted
agency decision was the 1965 Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company
case.132 The case involved a gas pipeline company’s service to
customers via branch or lateral lines (lines that break off of main
pipelines to transport gas to end users), and whether terms and
conditions of the company’s service for these lines should be included
in its tariff. The FPC held this was required, stating that a natural gas
utility was required to file documents establishing a “consistent and
predictable course of conduct of the supplier that affects its financial
relationship with the consumer.”133
Typical of this era is Village of Winnetka v. FERC,134 a 1982 case in
which a Chicago suburb purchased electricity from its utility when it
could not produce enough in its municipal power plant. The utility’s
tariff did not spell out the conditions or timing of these sales in detail.
When the utility changed those terms, the village filed a complaint
with FERC. It argued the utility should amend its tariff to include the
approach to energy sales it had maintained for seven years as a
“practice,” and could not depart from this approach without prior
FERC approval. FERC rejected the complaint with a summary
discussion. The D.C. Circuit cited the rule of reason and the Michigan
Wisconsin standard defining “practice” as controlling, and vacated
FERC’s order, holding FERC had not adequately explained its
reasoning as to why the particular course of conduct was not a
“practice” under this standard.
As explained by then-Judge Scalia in the D.C. Circuit’s 1985 City of
Cleveland decision, a utility’s tariff filing need only include practices
that affect rates “significantly.” FERC had issued an order requiring a
utility to file rate schedules with details about its provision of electric
service to Cleveland. The city wanted the utility to set forth its

131 Town of Easton v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 24 FERC ¶ 61,251, 61,531 (1983).
The similarity to the “rule of reason” test in antitrust law occasionally caused judicial
confusion. See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 820 F.2d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting the application of antitrust standards in reviewing FERC’s actions).
132 Mich. Wis. Pipe Line Co., 34 F.P.C. 621 (1965).
133 Id. at 626.
134 Vill. of Winnetka v. FERC, 678 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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practices in even more detail. The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s order
accepting the utility’s compliance filing, stating in part,
[T]here is an infinitude of practices affecting rates and service.
The statutory directive must reasonably be read to require the
[tariff disclosure] of only those practices that affect rates and
services significantly, . . . It is obviously left to the
Commission, within broad bounds of discretion, to give
concrete application to this amorphous directive.135
Like the language of Michigan Wisconsin, this struck a balance in
filing between detail and transparency, focusing on the connection
between the utility’s activity and rates. “Routine” activities did not
have to be filed; “significant” ones did.136 What about activities by
actors other than utilities that were significantly connected to rates,
such as construction of new power plants? Neither City of Cleveland
nor Michigan Wisconsin involved facts of this sort, so the question of
whether these practices had to be filed went unaddressed. For years,
then, there was a pragmatic connection between the filing requirement
and the extent of FERC jurisdiction. It was simply assumed that the
standard for filing was the last word on agency authority.137
For years, no court analyzed the matter further. Unlike “just and
reasonable” and “undue discrimination,” which were the subject of
many judicial decisions, “the filing requirements of § 205 of the FPA
did not receive such close scrutiny.”138 One reason was the existence
of a “gentleman’s agreement” between FERC and the utilities:
[F]or certain categories of cases, the industry and the
Commission staff over the years must have operated under a
tacit understanding. Instead of arguing over which classes of
agreements came within section 205, the industry filed those
contracts covering transactions it thought (or the staff
indicated) the agency would scrutinize. Companies held back
135 City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in
original); cf. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(interpreting the nearly identical NGA ratemaking section and holding that FERC
properly excused utilities from filing policies or practices that dealt only with matters
of “practical insignificance” to providing service to customers).
136 See Rokach, supra note 66, at 86.
137 Cf. Richard McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 18-19 (1985) (noting that the FCC’s jurisdiction in the communications field in
the years after the Communications Act’s enactment was largely decided by tariff
filings).
138 Rokach, supra note 66, at 84.
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those in which the Commission would show no interest, even
if the agreements were jurisdictional.139
For several decades, neither FERC nor the courts tested the limits of
FERC’s jurisdiction. The filing requirement was interpreted informally
under this “tacit understanding,” which helps explain the paucity of
reported decisions. Important issues were unexplored in the FPA, the
legislative history, or the cases.140
III. THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION AND MODERN APPLICATIONS OF
“UNDUE DISCRIMINATION” AND “PRACTICES AFFECTING RATES”
This situation changed dramatically with the advent of electric
industry competition, when the meanings of “practices and
“discrimination” both changed substantially, but in similar ways. The
transformation of “undue discrimination” to a modern platform for
addressing industry-wide conditions is well known and the subject of
much commentary.141 Now, FERC v. EPSA confirms that the meaning
of “practices affecting rates” changed as well.
Beginning with the first shift, FERC’s interpretation of “undue
discrimination” extended beyond an individual utility’s conduct. In
agency decisions and rules, FERC has taken an industry-wide view of
its anti-discrimination mandate, using it to promote competition by
establishing open access to the transmission grid, and prompting the
creation of ISO/RTOs and the wholesale markets. As a result, a second
transformation has taken place. FERC’s oversight role has changed to
overseeing market conditions to prevent discriminatory practices
toward consumers. Instead of judging whether an individual firm’s
action is unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory, it decides whether
features of the wholesale markets’ operation contribute to this effect.
The Supreme Court has strongly endorsed these two interpretive
shifts.142
139 Id.; cf. Boyd, supra note 1, at 1630 (observing that during this period, “[f]or the
next several decades, the electric utility industry operated in a fairly stable economic
and regulatory environment, . . . [under a] ‘public utility consensus’ forged among
managers, regulators, and technical experts”).
140 Rokach, supra note 66, at 99-100 (stating that “the legislative history of section
205(a) omitted any mention of this issue”).
141 Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 1, at 1750-51; see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Realizing the Promise of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 466-68 (2005); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of
Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 456-57 (2002) (discussing the justification of
Order 2000 under the anti-discrimination mandate).
142 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 1 (2002) (upholding Order 888 and
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“Practices affecting rates” authority has changed in similar fashion.
First, the understanding of “practices” has transitioned from firmspecific tariffs to aspects of market operation. Second, the cases have
given FERC broad authority to regulate activities relating to terms and
conditions of market operation, even in some cases if they conflict
with state law. Finally, FERC v. EPSA and the cases preceding it have
set limits similar to those of the past, requiring a direct and significant
relationship to wholesale rates.
Why did it take until 2016 for definitive confirmation of these shifts?
There are several answers. In the market setting, the meaning of
“practices” is not self-evident, in terms of who is covered or what
conduct is. Before the market era, “practices” were those of individual
utilities. In markets, whose actions can FERC regulate as “practices”?
And what is the scope of “practices”: could FERC regulate any activities
that affect markets? In New York v. FERC, there was no need to decide
whether “practices” had limits. Utilities’ actions hampering transmission
access came within FERC’s unquestioned authority over
transmission.143 Not so with an activity such as demand response,
where the scope of FERC’s authority is not spelled out in the FPA’s text.
Another challenge stemmed from the fact that unlike other
industries that deregulated, FERC kept tariffs, albeit in a different
form. The transition to competition began later in the utility industry
than in other deregulating industries.144 Yet almost alone among these
industries, the utility industry kept the regulatory device for
addressing discrimination — the tariff.145 FERC has encouraged
related agency actions, based in part on the agency’s concern about discriminatory
practices under sections 205 and 206).
143 See id.
144 See Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 549 (noting that the electric
utility industry deregulated after the airline and telecommunications industries);
Claire A. Watkins, Nuclear Power Rate Regulation After Eastern Enterprises: Are
Ratepayers Being Taken for a Ride?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191, 208 (2000) (same
conclusion).
145 See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (describing
the different policy path taken by restructuring of the electric power industry from the
transition to competition in other regulated industries).
Domestic air fares were deregulated by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-504 (1978), which removed the tariff requirement. The Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, completed final deregulation of the motor
carrier industry and removed the requirement that carriers file their domestic
passenger fares and rules with the Department of Transportation.
Most of the telecommunications field is regulated today without tariffs, but some
aspects are still tariffed. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
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competitive markets and regulated the industry through broad pro
forma tariffs that describe the markets’ structure and operating rules
for competitors and consumers, not by firm-specific tariffs. This made
for difficulties in interpreting earlier cases. What relevance was there
for judicial decisions about firm-specific tariffs when the nature of
tariffs had changed? Moreover, what about the ICA cases that made
distinctions about practices that could be termed discriminatory: what
significance, if any, did they have in the wholly different context of the
modern wholesale markets?
This Part discusses a standard for FERC’s jurisdiction in wholesale
markets that addresses these questions and is consistent with both
FERC v. EPSA and the underlying movement in the law: FERC may
regulate those practices which impact the wholesale markets directly
or are integral to the proper functioning of the wholesale markets, but
not practices that are only remote or insignificant in their connection
to these markets. As discussed in this Part, this expanded
understanding of FERC v. EPSA’s “directly affecting” principle squares
with the historical interpretations of “practices” and cases decided by
the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit during the modern, market-based
era. Moreover, it is also similar to the evolution of the interpretation of
“undue discrimination,” giving FERC its proper role in addressing the
challenges posed in modern markets.
A. Evolution of “Undue Discrimination” to an Industry-Wide Focus
By the 1980s, a modern approach to “discrimination” was needed. As
FERC stated, “changing conditions in the electric utility industry,
including the emergence of non-traditional suppliers and greater
competition in bulk power markets,”146 required it. FERC’s fact-specific
test for undue discrimination allowed utility customers to challenge
unfavorable rates by arguing that the utility offered improperly lower
rates to its other customers. Protecting customers who purchased
electricity at market-based rates required a different analysis.

110 Stat. 56, “detariffed” (opened to competition) many services in the telephone
industry. Following detariffing, most services are handled competitively but some
matters are still regulated by tariffs. See Mandatory Detariffing of Interstate and
International Interexchange Services, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Aug. 8, 2008),
https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/ppd/detariffing1.html; Tariffs, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/tariffs (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
146 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (1996).
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FERC’s statutory mandate remained the same,147 but the issues it
faced in section 206 discrimination claims were different. Utilities
owning transmission lines were perceived to offer terms and conditions
for transmission service on their own systems more favorable than those
offered to the upstart generators seeking to compete with them. This led
to a raft of claims of undue discrimination by these generators to FERC
that were grounded in unfair treatment when compared to the electric
utility’s use of its own transmission system, not in rate differentials for
customers of the same utility.
FERC’s groundbreaking response was the 1994 American Electric
Power decision.148 This decision added a “comparability” requirement
to the undue discrimination test, requiring a utility tariff to “offer
third parties access on the same or comparable basis, and under the
same or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission
provider’s uses of its system.”149 The “comparability” standard
departed from the focus on an individual utility’s customers,150
ensuring that utilities could not favor their own generation over that
of independent generators when providing transmission service. It has
no direct support in the FPA; “comparability” is found nowhere in the
statute.151 Instead, FERC interpreted the section 205 ban on “undue
prejudice or disadvantage” and “just and reasonable” requirement to
mandate it.152
Later, FERC adopted the comparability standard on an industrywide basis in Order 888, requiring open access to the transmission
grid. Order 888 contained the pro forma Open Access Transmission
Tariff (“OATT”), which enshrined the principle of comparability. It
required that public utilities subject to FERC’s jurisdiction owning or
controlling transmission lines provide open, non-discriminatory
access on them to transmission customers. The OATT contains no
147 Cf. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550
U.S. 45, 50 (2007) (noting that with competition neither Congress nor the FCC
“abandoned traditional regulatory requirements”).
148 Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 67 FERC ¶ 61,168 (1994).
149 Id. ¶ 61,490.
150 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (stating that, “the Commission broadened its undue
discrimination analysis (which traditionally had focused on the rates, terms, and
conditions faced by similarly situated third-party customers) to include a focus on the
rates, terms, and conditions of a utility’s own uses of the transmission system”).
151 SCOTT HEMPLING, FERC’S DEMAND RESPONSE DECISIONS: WHAT ARE THE
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS? 4 (2013), available at http://sustainableferc.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Library/5-Scott-Hempling-Papers/FERC’s%20Demand%
20Response%20Decisions%20(July%202013).pdf.
152 Ala. Mun. Elec. Auth. v. FERC, 662 F.3d 571, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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firm-specific rates or service terms and conditions. Instead, it is a tariff
made generally applicable to the entire class of transmission grid
owners and operators. Each public utility was required to file the pro
forma OATT, with only limited exceptions.153 Today, ISOs and RTOs
— regulated public utilities as defined under the FPA — operate
wholesale markets under this system. FERC revises the pro forma
OATT with rules — such as Order 745 and 2007’s Order 890 that
reformed the OATT — that change market operations by requiring
tariff changes.154
FERC justified Order 888 under sections 205 and 206, and a D.C.
Circuit decision in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC that further
emboldened it to interpret the anti-discrimination provision
broadly.155 Applying comparability by requiring non-discriminatory
open access to transmission services, FERC explained, “is critical to
the full development of competitive wholesale generation markets and
the lower consumer prices achievable through such competition.”156
Order 888 changed the interpretation of “undue discrimination” in a
fundamental way: it was not based on a showing of facts that
demonstrated that an individual utility unduly discriminated in favor
of specific customers against others, or had engaged in specific
discriminatory behavior such as hampering access to transmission
lines. This broad interpretation drew criticism,157 but is settled now. In
New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court upheld Order 888, and its use

153 The pro forma OATT contains the minimum terms and conditions for nondiscriminatory transmission service, and every transmission-owning public utility
must abide by the tariff in providing transmission services to itself and others. 18
C.F.R. § 35.28 (2015) (describing requirements); see also Transmission Access Policy
Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Once their OATTs were effective, public utilities were allowed to file deviations
from the OATT consistent with or superior to the pro forma OATT’s terms and
conditions. 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385.
154 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service,
Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,294–12,489 (Mar. 15, 2007). Order 890
contained a number of reforms to the OATT, including new mechanisms for the
determination of “available transfer capability” (in lay terms, the amount of space
available) on transmission lines.
155 See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
156 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385.
157 William L. Massey, Robert S. Fleishman & Mary J. Doyle, Reliability-Based
Competition in Wholesale Electricity: Legal and Policy Perspectives, 25 ENERGY L.J. 319,
327 (2004) (noting that Order 888 provoked “much skepticism outside the agency”).
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of the undue discrimination provisions to reach conduct preventing
open access to the transmission lines.158
Courts have also confirmed that FERC’s authority now extends to
remedying discrimination in wholesale market operations. To cite one
example, FERC polices market power abuses to protect consumers.159
In FERC’s major contemporary rulemakings, the focus is on whether
the market system has systemic shortcomings, creating discrimination.
This interpretive evolution is not surprising. FERC’s authority to
oversee markets for discrimination is directly comparable to the
original goal of regulation: remedying anti-competitive behavior. It
continues the agency focus, dating to the ICA, on protecting
consumers by fostering awareness of matters that can directly
influence rates, and curbing or checking those actions that cause
undue discrimination among classes of market participants and as a
result cause rates to be unjust or unreasonable. The light shines “on
particular transactions and activities, not on particular persons,”160
and the core concern is still “the role being played by any given person
or entity and the transaction being regulated.”161
But questions about interpreting “practices” remained. When FERC
finds “practices affecting rates” are discriminatory, it can order a
remedy such as Order 745. That begs the central question: what
practices may FERC regulate?
B. Evolution of “Practices Affecting Rates” in the Modern Era
As the Supreme Court has now stated, the meaning of “practices
affecting rates” has evolved as well to center regulatory attention on
158

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002).
See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
County, 554 U.S. 527, 535 (2008); Richard B. Miller, Neil H. Butterklee & Margaret
Comes, “Buyer Side” Mitigation in Organized Capacity Markets: Time for a Change?, 33
ENERGY L.J. 449, 455 (2012). Specific analyses of FERC’s role in dealing with market
power abuses in the California wholesale electricity markets include Spence &
Prentice, supra note 118, at 159, and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be
Trusted?: The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX
L.J. 1, 52 (2004). Cf. Speta, supra note 74, at 1195-96 (discussing the potential for
application of nondiscrimination principles to the regulation of broadband); Barbara
van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination
Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2015) (discussing the potential for
application of nondiscrimination principles to regulation of the Internet).
160 Brief of the Microgrid Resources Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners and in Support of Reversal at 12, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
161 Id. at 13.
159
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market conduct, giving FERC authority over core functions of the
markets relating directly to jurisdictional rates. This was no overnight
shift, but was decades in the making.
1.

FERC Interprets “Practices” for Section 205 Filings: The Prior
Notice Order

The modern evolution of “practices affecting rates” authority began
just before Order 888’s promulgation, with the 1993 Prior Notice
proceeding,162 FERC’s first significant analysis of “practices.” Events
leading to Prior Notice started with the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978,163 which promoted conservation and alternative
forms of electricity production with financial incentives. This led to
the rise of nonutility generators in competition with incumbent
utilities,164 and pressure by those generators for access to the electric
transmission grid.165 The 1992 Energy Policy Act responded with a
provision stimulating growth of “merchant generators” (generators
that produced electricity but served no retail customers)166 and a
largely ineffective provision that authorized FERC to order electric
utilities’ “wheeling” of power (transmitting power for third parties)
over their transmission lines.167 These developments, among others,
prompted FERC to take steps to authorize wholesale sellers to charge
market-based rates for their electricity sales.168
162 Prior Notice and Filing Requirements Under Part II of the Federal Power Act,
64 FERC ¶ 61,139, order on clarification, 65 FERC ¶ 61,081 (1993) [hereinafter Prior
Notice].
163 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645). PURPA promoted conservation programs and
alternative forms of electricity production by providing financial incentives to new,
nonutility producers of renewable electricity and cogeneration, designated as
qualifying facilities (QFs). Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 549. The
requirements for QFs are found at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292.203.
164 Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 549-50; Hoecker & Smith, supra
note 8, at 75.
165 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 151.
166 Market Oversight Glossary, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/
market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp (defining a “merchant generator” as “[a] generating
plant built with no energy sales contracts in place”). As Professors Hammond and
Spence note, this type of arrangement was virtually unheard of prior to 1980. Hammond
& Spence, supra note 8, at 151; see also Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 550
(discussing the rapid growth of the wholesale power market in the 1990s).
167 Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 26, at 550; Hoecker & Smith, supra note
8, at 75 (noting procedural limitations of actions under the statute). Later, Order 888
replaced this provision.
168 Spence & Prentice, supra note 118, at 147-48. The current requirements for
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The initial surge of market-based rate proposals led to the Prior
Notice order, which dealt with section 205’s filing requirement and
discussed filing of non-jurisdictional “practices” connected to
activities over which FERC did have jurisdiction. As such, it was an
essential building block for FERC’s broader authority over practices
affecting rates.
Prior Notice emerged from FERC’s 1991 Central Maine decision.169
Central Maine Power had fourteen market-based rate agreements to
sell power at wholesale. These agreements had expired, but Central
Maine had not filed them with FERC. Liability was clear — the utility
had violated section 205170 — and the remedy seemed straightforward:
FERC would announce that Central Maine was required to file its
agreements before commencing service — not after it ended — and
impose a penalty. FERC did just that.
If FERC had stopped there, the case would have had limited effect.
However, FERC was concerned about filing delays by utilities selling
both at market-based rates and at cost-based (that is, traditional) rates,
and decided to comprehensively address these delays.171 To prompt
compliance, it announced an amnesty period: sellers had 60 days after
the Central Maine order to file their agreements.
FERC believed this would affect only a handful of “careless
companies,”172 but the “file or else” position immediately created far
more widespread uncertainty. FERC appeared to be systematically
putting teeth into the filing requirement, which made utilities
nervous.173 Utilities wondered whether they had to file documents
they had assumed required no FERC approval, and there were many
market-based rate (“MBR”) authority for wholesale sales of energy, capacity, and
ancillary services are spelled out in FERC Order 697, promulgated in 2007. MarketBased Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by
Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,239, 72,240-72,241 (Dec. 20, 2007)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Spence & Prentice, supra note 118, at 147-48.
Courts have upheld FERC’s use of market-based rates. California ex rel. Harris v.
FERC, No. 12-71958 at 7 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that FERC used an improper
methodology to evaluate market power in the California electricity crisis, but
upholding FERC’s basic MBR authority); California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d
1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 152
(“FERC began to authorize most wholesale sellers of electricity to charge marketbased rates.”).
169 See Cent. Me. Power Co., 56 FERC ¶ 61,200 (1991).
170 Rokach, supra note 66, at 87.
171 Report of the Committee on Electric Utility Regulation, 15 ENERGY L.J. 505, 528
(1994).
172 Rokach, supra note 66, at 90 (noting that FERC received hundreds of filings).
173 See id. at 85.
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such situations. Consider a utility’s contract to rent space on its pole
to a phone company, which the utility might not file because FERC
lacked jurisdiction over the phone company. Was it now required to
file it? Surveying the situation, the Edison Electric Institute, the trade
association representing major utilities, complained to FERC that,
“confusion existed as to the extent of the FERC’s jurisdiction over
electric rates and which ancillary contracts the Commission would
decide utilities must file under the FPA.”174
Recognizing the problem, FERC convened an industry-wide
technical conference, designed to develop policies for filing expired
agreements175 but quickly expanding well beyond that. Utilities raised
questions about the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over forty separate
categories of activities. The eventual result was the Prior Notice order
and its jurisdictional “Appendix”176 covering numerous specific
situations and deciding with respect to each “how close a connection
must the FERC make between an agreement and the activities
Congress ordered the Commission to regulate in order to exercise
jurisdiction.”177 FERC specifically linked its new thoroughness to
ongoing industry changes.178
FERC’s analysis of the “contributions in aid of construction”
(“CIAC”) issue illustrates Prior Notice’s importance. CIAC involves a
situation where a utility customer requests new facilities or upgrades
to existing ones. The utility agrees to construct the upgrades, and the
customer agrees to pay for the upgrades separately, that is,
“contribute” up front to the construction cost. Many industry
participants thought CIAC agreements, being construction contracts,
did not have to be filed because they related to construction of
transmission lines (regulated by state law) and not to transmission of
electricity (over which FERC has jurisdiction).
FERC disagreed. In American Municipal Power-Ohio v. Ohio Edison179
decided before Prior Notice, Ohio Edison executed an agreement with
American Municipal Power-Ohio (“AMP-Ohio”) that provided for
CIAC in exchange for Ohio Edison building transmission facilities to
174

Id. at 94.
Id. (observing that FERC was surprised by the number of jurisdictional issues
raised); Report of the Committee on Electric Utility Regulation, supra note 171, at 528.
176 The Appendix is set forth at Prior Notice, supra note 162, 64 FERC ¶¶ 61,984–
61,996.
177 Rokach, supra note 66, at 99.
178 See id. at 94.
179 Am. Muni. Power-Ohio, Inc. v. Ohio Edison Co. (AMP-Ohio), 57 FERC
¶ 61,358 (1991), reh’g denied, 58 FERC ¶ 61,182 (1992).
175
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interconnect Ohio Edison to an AMP-Ohio member. AMP-Ohio
agreed to pay for these in advance. FERC held the CIAC agreement
covered facilities that Ohio Edison used “in connection with”
jurisdictional transmission service “because it involves facilities
necessary in order to provide jurisdictional service; indeed, the new
interconnection was intended to improve jurisdictional service that
Ohio Edison provides to AMP-Ohio.”180 Therefore, FPA section 205
required filing of the contract, even though FERC had no jurisdiction
over the underlying construction.
In the Prior Notice proceeding, utilities sought to clarify this
position. What if the facility being constructed was a generating plant?
One utility contended that agreements for construction of generating
plants are exclusively state jurisdictional matters, notwithstanding that
the plant might connect to and use the interstate transmission grid.
The Prior Notice order and Jurisdictional Appendix responded,
[T]he question of our jurisdiction over a particular contract
depends on whether the contract contains a rate or charge for
or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric
energy in interstate commerce, or whether the contract affects
or relates to such rates or service.
[CIAC] agreements which must be filed for Commission [rate]
review must relate to transmission in interstate commerce or
sales for resale of electric energy in interstate commerce. . . .
As we noted earlier, even in . . . our most recent order on the
subject, we held that in order to come within our purview, the
agreement must contain a charge connected to jurisdictional
service.
This established several important principles and opened doors to
the future. A direct connection to rates made a “practice” of a third
party such as a construction firm jurisdictional, extending FERC
authority to matters beyond the utility’s own “price, availability,
firmness, duration or other terms or conditions of any existing
services.”181 Directness meant a connection measured in economic

180 Id. ¶ 61,161; see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 98 FERC ¶ 61,304, 62,301 (2002)
(citing AMP-Ohio); Re W. Mass. Elec. Co., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,182, 61,662–61,663
(1992) (citing AMP-Ohio and requiring filings of specified agreements as jurisdictional
CIAC agreements).
181 Massey, Fleishman, & Doyle, supra note 157, at 329 (quoting City of San Diego
v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 51 FERC ¶ 61,058 (1990)).

1822

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:1783

terms: a document was jurisdictional if it contained a charge folded
directly into wholesale rates.
Even more important was that the economic connection between
the activity and jurisdictional service did not have to be immediate.
FERC stated that it had “considerable flexibility in determining what
rates and practices are ‘for or in connection with,’ ‘affecting,’
‘pertaining’ or ‘[relating] to’ jurisdictional service and, accordingly,
must be filed . . . .”182 The activity only had to be connected to rates or
services over which FERC had jurisdiction, so it was sufficient if it
would influence rates later. The critical link was that “the contract
affects or relates to [wholesale] rates or service.”183 FERC marshaled
cases and agency decisions to support this broad view of its authority.
For example, it relied on an Eighth Circuit decision involving natural
gas activities, which found FERC had authority over those activities
undertaken “in connection with” jurisdictional service,184 and cited
City of Cleveland. And it stated that filing was required even if state
laws governed the underlying activities.
FERC stated this was its general position on its jurisdiction, which
left the agency much discretion to resolve specific situations. For over
twenty years, Prior Notice has been a cornerstone of the agency’s
approach to the filing requirement, cited often in agency
proceedings.185
2.

Toward a New Meaning of “Practices” and a Limiting Principle

Prior Notice gave more depth to the filing requirement’s purpose of
transparency and awareness by requiring utilities to give FERC “prior
notice” of a wider range of documents that could affect customers’
rates. But its “directness” principle now extends more broadly to
FERC’s “practices affecting rates” jurisdiction in the market setting. As
the Court has stated, FERC can assert authority to act on matters in
modern wholesale markets “directly affecting” market rates.
Arriving at this conclusion required some interpretive building
blocks. First, the meaning of “practices” needed to adjust once again,
182

Prior Notice, supra note 162, 64 FERC ¶ 61,987.
Id. ¶ 61,990 (emphasis added).
184 Id. ¶ 61,987 (citing N. Nat. Gas Co. v. FERC, 929 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991)).
185 An online research query yielded 463 decisions citing Prior Notice, the vast
majority of which are FERC agency decisions. In addition to interpretive issues, issues
relating to waiver of the notice requirement arise frequently. See, e.g., SPS Atwell
Island, LLC, 152 FERC ¶ 61,080, 61,463–61,464 (July 28, 2015) (rejecting a waiver
request).
183
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to encompass aspects of market operation filed in ISO/RTOs’ tariffs
rather than in firm-specific tariffs. This was an issue Prior Notice could
not have addressed, as it predated the markets. That adjustment
happened without comment or controversy, as the law relating to tariff
filings simply carried over from the pre-market era. Numerous
contemporary agency decisions citing Prior Notice use its standard and
the City of Cleveland “significance” requirement to determine the
extent of FERC filing jurisdiction,186 without judicial challenge. And
FERC has cited City of Cleveland numerous times as the standard for
detail in ISO/RTOs’ tariffs.187
The more difficult matter concerns practices that are not filed in
ISO/RTOs’ tariffs but have “direct” and “significant” impacts on rates.
Here, too, the direct connection and significance requirements of Prior
Notice and City of Cleveland have carried over to the modern setting.
Before FERC v. EPSA, courts expressed FERC’s authority over these
“practices affecting rates” in various different ways, without one
consistent verbal formulation emerging. They gave FERC authority to
regulate “key input[s] into the market-based mechanism,” “matters
most appropriately resolved by [FERC] as part of its overriding
authority to evaluate and implement all applicable wholesale rate
schedules,” and terms that “directly and significantly affect the
wholesale rates at which the operating companies exchange energy.”
The requirement of a direct economic relationship continued, as did
the requirement that practices can be remedied only if FERC finds that
a specific practice has caused undue discrimination.
FERC v. EPSA more precisely defines the shift from a focus on
individual firms to market operations — and confirms and limits it.
Prior to FERC v. EPSA, no single judicial decision addressed the scope
of “practices affecting rates” as comprehensively as New York v. FERC
did in the discrimination context. Instead, courts focused on specific
practices rather than enunciating broad principles, making it
sometimes appear as if the doctrine had developed haphazardly. To
186 See, e.g., Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 152 FERC ¶ 61,073 (July 27,
2015) (agreement for development of a transmission line held jurisdictional, under
the Prior Notice standard).
187 See, e.g., Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 152 FERC ¶ 61,063 (July 21, 2015)
(requiring readiness criteria to be incorporated in the California ISO tariff); PJM
Interconnection, LLC, 140 FERC ¶ 61,222 (Sept. 20, 2012).
Some decisions have allowed ISO/RTOs to specify certain market rules in ancillary
documents such as business practice manuals, rather than in the tariffs themselves.
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 136 FERC ¶ 61,038 (July 19, 2011);
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 147 FERC ¶ 61,268 (June 30, 2014)
(requiring filing in the tariff rather than in a business practice manual).
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compound the problem, some decisions reached back to the past for
insights without acknowledging historical shifts in the meaning of
“practices,” or occasionally took prior cases out of context or
misconstruing them.
After FERC v. EPSA, FERC’s authority is broad, like the historical
authority over “practices.” As the Court noted, the breadth of
“practices” and “affecting” gives FERC tremendous flexibility, but also
portends regulatory overreach if not carefully limited. Taken in their
entirety, and viewed against the historical context, FERC v. EPSA and
the cases that preceded it provide a limiting principle. The limiting
principle inherent in the “practices” “directly affecting” rates formula
can be summarized as this: FERC’s “practices” jurisdiction extends to
terms and conditions of the operation of wholesale markets which
impact the wholesale markets directly and significantly, or are integral
to the proper functioning of the wholesale markets, but not practices
that have only a remote or insignificant connection. Applying this
principle gives appropriate limits to reduce any lingering uncertainty
about the scope of “practices” “directly affecting” wholesale rates —
and holds important implications for the jurisdictional dividing line
between states and FERC.
C. D.C. Circuit Cases Supporting and Limiting Authority over Practices
Affecting Rates
In numerous cases dating to the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit held FERC
has authority to regulate practices directly affecting the wholesale
markets. These cases began with a line of precedents strengthening
FERC’s authority to review rules related to capacity markets, in which
owners of power plants are paid to have capacity available if needed in
the future.188 Capacity markets are thought to be necessary because
prices in other ISO/RTO markets are not always sufficiently high to
keep existing plants from shutting down or to entice new plants to
enter the market. Specifying the amount of capacity — the amount of
generation needed on the system — has consistently been viewed as a
factor within FERC’s control. It can have impacts on states’ authority
188 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 153; Paul L. Joskow, Competitive Electricity
Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity, MIT ECON. (June 12, 2006), available
at http://economics.mit.edu/files/1190. Not all ISO/RTOs have forward capacity markets,
although the PJM, New England and New York systems do. Capacity markets generally
seek to have generation capacity online and ready to produce electricity at least one year
ahead of time. RPM Base Residual Auction FAQs, PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC,
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-residualauction-faqs.ashx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (three-year time horizon).
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to approve requests to build power plants, because it decides how
much capacity is needed in the region (a factor states traditionally take
into account when deciding whether power plants should be built).
This did not stop the D.C. Circuit from supporting FERC’s actions.
1.

Capacity Market Cases

The first case involving FERC’s authority to regulate capacity in
wholesale transactions, Municipalities of Groton v. FERC,189 involved
the New England Power Pool Agreement (“NEPOOL”), a “power
pool” that later transformed into ISO-New England.190 By the 1970s,
twenty-one of these interconnected networks of transmission lines
enabled coordination among neighboring utilities.191 Voluntary
coordination arrangements could include a variety of services,192 and
pooling had significant benefits for participating utilities, such as
reduced investment in generation reserves (power plants kept in
reserve to be fired up as needed)193 and coordinated planning.
These power pools were voluntary, and governed by agreements
among their members. In Municipalities of Groton v. FERC, the D.C.
Circuit upheld FERC’s authority to review a section of the NEPOOL
Agreement that included a deficiency charge for each participating
utility.194 If that utility’s amount of generating capacity fell by more
than 1% below the level set in the agreement, it owed a charge to the
pool. The challengers argued that FERC lacked jurisdiction over this
charge because it was designed solely as an incentive to encourage

189

Municipalities of Groton v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In 1998, FERC granted the New England Power Pool’s request for recognition as
ISO New England, and approved its proposed market rules. New Eng. Power Pool, 83
FERC ¶ 61,045, 85 FERC ¶ 61,379 (1998), order on reh’g, 95 FERC ¶ 61,074 (2001).
191 For a discussion of power pools, see James F. Fairman & John C. Scott,
Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 1159, 1168-71 (1977).
192 Power pools can facilitate matters such as purchase and sale of reserve generating
capacity, purchase and sale of electricity during emergencies and maintenance, and
seasonal exchange of low-cost energy and centralized coordination of generation based
on cost. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKETS AND
POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 122-23 (2015).
193 “Reserve generating capacity” is “generating capacity available to meet peak or
abnormally high demands for power and to generate power during scheduled or
unscheduled outages.” Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/
glossary/index.cfm?id=R (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
194 Municipalities of Groton, 587 F.2d at 1301; see also Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v.
FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that FERC could condition
approval of a power pool agreement on adoption of specific membership criteria).
190
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participating utilities to have enough generation, and did not represent
a charge for a wholesale service or transmission. The court disagreed.
It reasoned that “the Commission’s inclusive jurisdictional
mandate . . . ‘with respect to’ jurisdictional transmissions, or ‘affecting’
such transmissions or services cannot be parsed so nicely.”195 The
court then concluded: “It is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes that
the deficiency charge affects the fee that a participant pays for power
and reserve service, irrespective of the objective underlying that
charge. This . . . is well within the Commission’s authority . . . .”196
What mattered was that the charge “affected” transmission rates
within FERC’s jurisdiction, not whether this incentive encouraged
construction of generating plants over which FERC has no authority.
In more recent decisions, the D.C. Circuit confirmed this approach,
concluding that FERC has authority to review a variety of rules related
to capacity. In the 2009 decision Connecticut DPUC v. FERC,197 the
D.C. Circuit held that FERC had authority to approve the “Installed
Capacity Requirement” (“ICR”), the core mechanism of the ISO-New
England capacity market. The ICR is a determination of the minimum
amount of capacity required on the regional grid, based on forwardlooking estimates of peak demand.198
The court reasoned that FERC had “practices affecting rates”
jurisdiction over the ICR because “capacity decisions . . . affect FERCjurisdictional transmission rates for that system without directly
implicating generation facilities.”199 The court added, based on Groton,
that FERC “may directly establish prices for capacity-or . . . prices for
failing to acquire enough capacity-even for the express purpose of
incentivizing construction of new”200 power plants. It determined the
ICR was not a specific command to anyone to build a specific new
power plant, but simply is an estimate of peak demand on the
system.201 Thus, it was not direct regulation over generating facilities:
195

Municipalities of Groton, 587 F.2d at 1302.
Id.
197 Conn. Dep’t. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1110 (2010).
198 The ICR is the “measure of the installed resources that are projected to be
necessary to meet both ISO New England’s and the Northeast Power Coordination
Council’s reliability standards, with respect to satisfying the peak demand forecast for
New England while maintaining the required reserve capacity.” Installed Capacity
Requirements, ISO-NEW ENGLAND, http://www.iso-ne.com/system-planning/resourceplanning/installed-capacity-requirements (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
199 Conn. Dep’t. of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 484.
200 Id. at 482.
201 Id. at 481-82; see Miller, Butterklee & Comes, supra note 159, at 452-53
196
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as the Supreme Court later reiterated, “[s]tates retained their ultimate
authority over the construction of new generation facilities.”202
Similarly, in the 2014 case of New England Power Generators Ass’n v.
FERC,203 the D.C. Circuit evaluated FERC’s authority to approve
“buyer-side mitigation” measures (the power of large buyers to
artificially depress market prices204) for the ISO-NE capacity market.
This took the form of a test to determine whether a new power plant
will unduly depress market prices. Certain new plants are subjected to
a minimum bid requirement, known as a “minimum offer price rule”
(“MOPR”), which could prevent them from clearing in the capacity
market auction. This was controversial because of the potential
adverse impact on market prices for certain types of power plants.205
The New England court held that FERC had authority to require the
buyer-side mitigation measures, reasoning that these measures were “a
key input into the market-based mechanism” that FERC could
regulate because mitigation matters are “affecting or relating to
wholesale rates,” and citing Groton and Connecticut DPUC.206 Once
again, the D.C. Circuit stressed “that FERC’s mitigation measures here
do not entail direct regulation of facilities, a matter within the
exclusive control of the states.”207
2.

Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation: South Carolina
Public Service Authority

The 2014 D.C. Circuit decision in South Carolina Public Service
Authority v. FERC208 upheld FERC Order 1000,209 which reformed the
regional process for transmission planning and determining how to
allocate the costs of new transmission lines. One part of the opinion
addressed the removal of federal right of first refusal provisions, which
are the rights of utilities to develop and own transmission lines needed
(criticizing the ISO-New England approach).
202 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d
and remanded FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
203 New Eng. Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 757 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
204 Miller, Butterklee & Comes, supra note 159, at 456.
205 Id. at 462 (criticizing this test because states will not provide incentives for
power plants that would not be paid in energy markets).
206 New Eng. Power Generators Ass’n, 757 F.3d at 290-91 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub.
Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 478, 481).
207 Id.
208 S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
209 Id. at 48-49; Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, Order 1000, 18 C.F.R. pt 35 (2011).
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to serve customers in their own territories, even if other firms are
willing to do so.210 The South Carolina court noted that “[r]eforming
the practices of failing to engage in regional planning and ex ante cost
allocation for development of new regional transmission facilities . . .
involves a core reason underlying Congress’ instruction in Section
206.”211 The fact that regional transmission planning was a “practice
affecting rates” was “illustrated” by the D.C. Circuit decision in
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, the decision
upholding Order 888 later affirmed in New York v. FERC: each of these
activities “directly affects or is closely related to jurisdictional rates.”212
This conclusion was appropriate. Transmission planning and cost
allocation are “practices affecting rates” because they directly impact
market rates. A system with less transmission is more congested —
and produces more expensive rates for delivered electricity. And
FERC’s authority extends to requiring power transmission planning
and cost allocation methods, notwithstanding traditional state
authority over transmission siting, because Order 1000 did not
expressly intrude on states’ authority to approve individual
transmission lines.213 As in the capacity market cases, FERC can act, as
long as it does not directly regulate matters reserved to the states.
Showing that the meaning of “practices” has evolved, the South
Carolina court rejected an argument based on the Tank Car Case that
would have constrained “practices” narrowly to those “that directly
relate[] to the . . . service provided customers.”214 As described above,
this is how “practices” was interpreted in the early years after the
FPA’s enactment: the terms and conditions of individual firms’ service.
But the court rejected this interpretation, stating that, “because rights
of first refusal are directly tied to rates charged for electricity
transmission, such rights do directly relate to the service that is
provided (i.e., the provision of electricity transmission service).”215 As
the court added, “[t]he challenged orders here provide . . . an
210 SCOTT HEMPLING, ORDER 1000 NARROWS THE “RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL”: WILL
REGIONAL PROCESSES BE COST-EFFECTIVE AND NONDISCRIMINATORY? 1 (2012), available
at http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/files/pdf/ppr_memo_rofr_hempling05032.pdf.
211 S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 57 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 57, 64 (citing Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d
667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)) (holding
that Order 888 aimed to remedy discriminatory practices).
213 Id. at 62; cf. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 123 (noting
that, “[t]his authority to regulate in mixed jurisdictional settings alone supports
upholding Order 745”).
214 S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 74-75 n.7.
215 Id.
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economic principle that directly ties the practice the Commission
sought to regulate to rates,” and “[t]he direct economic relationship
between rights of first refusal and rates forecloses any suggestion that
characterizing these rights as practices affecting rates was somehow
impermissible.”216
Prior to FERC v. EPSA, a more succinct summary of expansive
“practices affecting rates” jurisdiction would have been hard to find.
As in the capacity market cases, “practices” are not limited to actions
taken by one utility — transmission planning and cost allocation are
ISO/RTO-wide actions, requiring actions by multiple parties. This
expansive view of authority is nevertheless consistent with the
historical interpretation of “practices” which focused on actions
impacting consumers. If it finds that transmission capacity in a region
is inadequate or the costs of new lines are not allocated properly,
FERC may act to blunt potential adverse impacts on electric utility
customers. States may have concurrent regulatory authority (for
example, their siting authority), but this is not dispositive of FERC’s
authority. As long as FERC can trace causation between practices and
rates that consists of a direct — but not necessarily immediate —
economic connection to wholesale rates, it may regulate the
practice.217
Note those words: “economic principle” and “direct economic
relationship.” This is Prior Notice reimagined for the modern setting.
The effect on rates must be capable of measurement in economic
terms, but need not be immediate. A right of first refusal over
construction of a transmission line can impact wholesale rates, but it
would take several intermediate steps to do so (for example, the line in
question would have to be permitted by a state, and then built). This
does not defeat FERC authority.
3.

A Limiting Principle for “Practices Affecting Rates”: Practices
that Directly Relate to or Are Integral to the Proper Functioning
of the Wholesale Markets

This discussion — and even FERC v. EPSA — leaves some important
questions open to further interpretation. Which features of wholesale
markets “directly affect” wholesale rates — and which do not?
216

Id. at 74-76 nn.7–8.
Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 198 (observing that, “[t]he historical
understanding of the regulatory contract seems to imply that FERC’s authority to
ensure rates are “just and reasonable” is limited to serving the economic interests of
consumers and investors”).
217
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“Directly affecting” is broad; one can think of many routine
“practices” of an ISO/RTO, such as personnel decisions, which would
not directly impact markets. How should the line be drawn? That is,
what connection between market operations and wholesale rates
confers jurisdiction on FERC, and how close must that connection be?
Prior Notice and City of Cleveland have continuing vitality, even as
firm-specific tariffs have given way to market tariffs. And focusing on a
direct and significant connection between an activity over which
FERC asserts jurisdiction and wholesale market rates is a limiting
principle confirmed by judicial decisions. As the Supreme Court
recognized, the standard’s most precise enunciation is the D.C.
Circuit’s “common-sense construction of the FPA’s language” in its
2004 California Independent System Operator v. FERC (CAISO)
decision:218 “those methods or ways of doing things on the part of the
utility that directly affect the rate or are closely related to the rate, not
all those remote things beyond the rate structure that might in some
sense indirectly or ultimately do so.”219
CAISO began in the California electricity crisis of 2000–2001.220
When rates skyrocketed, there was plenty of blame to go around.
Some fell squarely on the grid operator (the “California ISO,” or
“CAISO”), which was faulted for poor oversight of markets that led to
high electricity prices.221 When a corporation performs poorly,
directors’ heads’ roll. FERC, California’s governor, and the state
legislature all decided CAISO needed a new Board unsullied by the
crisis. And it got one, through a new California law that empowered
the governor to appoint its five members. When CAISO then
requested that FERC approve its market redesign proposal, FERC
ordered it to implement a new Board structure that it had “proposed”
earlier.222 It reasoned that a state-appointed Board could not be
“independent of market participants,” as Order 888 requires. CAISO
and others promptly challenged FERC’s action in the D.C. Circuit.

218 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016) (citing Cal.
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
219 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
220 Scholars have amply documented the numerous policy choices that contributed
to the crisis. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts
in a Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297 (2002).
221 See id. at 304.
222 Order Concerning Governance of the California Independent System Operator,
100 FERC ¶ 61,059 (2002).
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The uniqueness and perceived egregiousness of FERC’s action
obviously piqued the D.C. Circuit.223 Using a Chevron analysis, the
court barred FERC’s interpretation of “practices affecting rates” under
step one. The court found it “crystal clear” that interfering with a
board’s composition has no direct connection to rates.224 Then, it
decided that the words surrounding “practice” in section 205 were
“transactional terms,” none of which “suggest a congressional concern
with corporate governance or structure.”225 As the court observed:
It is quite a leap to move as FERC has from that context of
transactional terms to an implication that by the word
“practice,” Congress empowered the Commission not merely
to effect a reformation of some “practice” in a more traditional
sense of actions habitually being taken by a utility in
connection with a rate found to be unjust or unreasonable, but
also to empower the Commission to reform completely the
governing structure of the utility . . . .226
In response, FERC argued that it could regulate the “infinitude”
(that is, all) of practices involved in the wholesale markets, plucking
that word from City of Cleveland. The court rejected this, retorting
sharply: “We are not biting.”227 It noted (correctly) that City of
Cleveland did not fix the limits of FERC’s jurisdiction, but cited it and
Michigan Wisconsin for its limit on jurisdiction, although that case also
dealt with the filing requirement.228

223

Its analysis begins with the following statement:
First, lest there be any mistake, FERC has done nothing less than order a
public utility subject to its regulation to replace its governing board. We
offer no citation to any comparable order by FERC, or any other similar
federal regulatory body, because to the best of our knowledge, there is none.

Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 398.
224 Id. at 400.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 401.
228 Compare id., with Calpine Corp. v. FERC, 702 F.3d 41, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
where the court rejected FERC jurisdiction over “station power” by relying in part on
City of Cleveland. Station power is generally defined as “[e]nergy that is used to
operate an electric generating plant . . . lighting, power, and auxiliary facilities,
regardless of whether the energy is produced at the plant or comes from another
source.” See Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/
index.cfm?id=R (defining “station use,” a term interchangeable with the Calpine Corp.
court’s working definition of station power).
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Not done yet, the court reached back into history. Citing the Tank
Car Case, the court stated that the Supreme Court had interpreted
“practices” there to refer “only to a railroad’s terms of service and
rejected a broader construction in which ‘it could be contended . . .
that every detail of railroad operation is a practice within the meaning
of the Act.’”229 This implies the Tank Car Case set a precise limit on
defining “practices,” which is off the mark. Also, it misses entirely the
Tank Car Case’s context involving private cars, and the case’s
preservation of the ICC’s broad powers to define and remedy
discriminatory practices.
Despite these errors, the CAISO court articulated a compelling test
for “practices affecting rates,” citing to the D.C. Circuit’s previous
decision in American Gas Ass’n v. FERC,230 a case involving the natural
gas industry. In upholding FERC’s jurisdiction to issue portions of its
natural gas restructuring orders, the D.C. Circuit had held that FERC’s
reading of “contracts affecting” its jurisdictional rates was restricted by
the statute because “[c]ontracts that ‘affect’ a rate indirectly, merely by
affecting the costs that determine what pipeline sales rates are
permissible under the NGA’s ‘just and reasonable’ standard, are
beyond [the NGA’s] reach.”231 Echoing that test, CAISO limited
“practices” to include “those methods or ways of doing things on the
part of the utility that directly affect the rate or are closely related to
the rate, not all those remote things beyond the rate structure that
might in some sense indirectly or ultimately do so.”232 Replacing ISO
board members was not a “practice,” as it did not affect rates directly.
Streamlining this test in harmony with FERC v. EPSA, FERC’s
jurisdiction extends to “methods or ways of doing things” which
“directly affect” the wholesale markets or are integral to the proper
functioning of the wholesale markets, but not practices that are remote
or insignificant in their connection to the markets. In the demand
response context and elsewhere, the term “utility” in the CAISO test
must be read to mean “the ISO or RTO.” CAISO involved an entity
regulated as a “public utility” under the FPA: the California ISO. The
CAISO test can only apply directly to market activities of entities that
FERC regulates as “public utilities,”233 and not to others, such as
229 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 402 (citing United States v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 242 U.S. 208, 228-33 (1916)).
230 Id. at 403 (citing Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
231 Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
232 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403 (citing Am. Gas Ass’n, 912 F.2d
at 1506).
233 Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 50, at 404 n.64.
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demand response providers. Non-jurisdictional entities subject
themselves to FERC oversight by participating in the wholesale
markets and thereby directly affecting rates.
Under this standard, a direct connection to rates is critical, because
that means consumers can be harmed if FERC cannot regulate the
activities in question. It stretches credulity to imagine that changes in
the composition of an ISO board could harm consumers, although one
could hypothesize that it might. (Suppose all appointed board
members swore to prevent renewable resources from entering the
market, thinking them unreliable.) By contrast, an activity such as
transmission planning so directly affects rates that FERC should be
able to oversee it.
FERC v. EPSA’s focus on directness is consistent with historical
interpretations of “practices affecting rates.” It continues the focus
from pre-1980 cases and from Prior Notice on a direct relationship to
wholesale rates,234 even though the focus has shifted from an
individual utility’s service to the ability of the wholesale market to
serve customers. The directness standard derives further support from
earlier cases that mention the closeness of the relationship between
jurisdictional practices and wholesale rates. For example, in the 1988
Schneidewind case, the Supreme Court held that FERC had authority
to regulate a natural gas company’s capital structure because that is
“related directly to the rates FERC allows it to charge.”235
Another significant line of cases supporting the concept of
directness is the “cost trapping” decisions from the 1980s that held
that FERC has authority over “matters most appropriately resolved by
[FERC] as part of its overriding authority to evaluate and implement
all applicable wholesale rate schedules.”236 In these cases, FERC had
made decisions about how to allocate costs of cancelled nuclear plants
among utilities participating in multistate agreements. Some states felt
the allocations were unfair to their ratepayers, and declined to “pass
them through” into retail rates. The Supreme Court and several
appellate courts held this was impermissible and that states had to give

234

Massey, Fleishman & Doyle, supra note 157, at 329.
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 301, 308 (1988); cf. N.
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 92 (1963) (noting “the Federal
[Power] Commission’s authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the
purchasers’ cost structure and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to
consumers in other States” (emphasis added)).
236 James W. Moeller, Requiem for the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:
The ““Old”“ Federalism and State Regulation of Inter-State Holding Companies, 17
ENERGY L.J. 343, 377 & n.325–26 (1996).
235
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binding effect to FERC’s wholesale cost determinations;237 to hold
otherwise would interfere with FERC’s power to regulate “practices
affecting rates.”238 FERC could review capacity cost allocations
because “[c]apacity costs are a large component of wholesale rates”
and “while these provisions do not fix wholesale rates, their terms do
directly and significantly affect the wholesale rates at which the
operating companies exchange energy . . . .”239
IV. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE STANDARD
Because the directness standard could potentially be viewed as
somewhat indeterminate, this Part clarifies it. The discussion here
centers on “close call” cases that involve activity that appears to
“directly affect” wholesale rates, but also seems to involve matters
arguably outside of FERC’s purview. Numerous activities appear to
“affect” or “relate” to wholesale electricity markets. The limiting
principle discussed above cabins FERC’s authority to those practices
that directly affect wholesale rates, system reliability, and the supply
and pricing of energy at wholesale. By contrast, practices involving
steel and labor — mentioned by the D.C. Circuit — do not have this
kind of direct and significant effect on markets.
Where should the line be drawn? The discussion focuses on two
different policies: demand response compensation under Order 745
(now upheld in FERC v. EPSA), and a hypothetical “carbon adder”
that an ISO/RTO would propose to add an amount to the bid price of
sellers in the energy wholesale market it administers “to better
account for the full social costs of that electricity” in energy
markets.240 A related set of situations discussed here relates to
preemption cases involving the electric grid, where the issue involves
deciding whether FERC’s actions preempt state laws designed to
promote innovations in the electric grid.
Regarding the carbon adder, many have argued that the wholesale
markets value low-cost electricity, not environmentally friendly
electricity. They claim markets “do not price externalities and

237 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354, 356-57 (1988); Nantahala Power &
Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 965 (1986).
238 See Miss. Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1539-44 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g en
banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, 814 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated,
822 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1987), opinion reinstated, reh’g en banc denied, 822 F.2d 1103
(D.C. Cir. 1987), and opinion vacated in part on reh’g, 822 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
239 Id. at 1542 (emphasis added).
240 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 197-98.
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reliability well,”241 failing to account for externalities favoring fossil
fuel-fired generation over other sources (notably renewables and
nuclear). Some call for a carbon price to address this situation; others
believe FERC lacks authority to impose one.242 Still others have called
for a carbon adder as an option to facilitate compliance under the
Clean Power Plan, which EPA explicitly contemplates in its final
rule.243 FERC is likely reluctant to propose a carbon price,244 but if it
chose to do so, could it ground one as a “practice affecting rates”?
Providing further detail about the “directly affecting” standard yields
the answer: it could.
A. Four Factors for More Clearly Fixing the Limits of FERC’s Authority
This section discusses four factors to be used as guidelines in
ascertaining whether specific activities fit within FERC’s authority. It
concludes that the Supreme Court properly found that FERC has the
authority to make rules establishing demand response compensation,
and also concludes that FERC could impose the hypothetical carbon
adder. The four factors outlined here help define the dividing line
between federal and state jurisdiction, based on the “directly affecting”
standard.
1.

FERC Is Regulating Wholesale Market Participants in Their
Trading Activities

As the Court noted in FERC v. EPSA, “demand response programs
work through the [regional grid] operators’ regular auctions,” and
“every aspect of the regulatory plan happens exclusively on the
wholesale market and governs exclusively that market’s rules.”245 This
confirms FERC’s authority over the conduct of entities participating in
markets by virtue of its approval of market pro forma tariffs and the
rules contained in them. Thus, an activity is jurisdictional if it involves
FERC regulation of market rules or other aspects of direct
participation by jurisdictional entities (or those that could be, by
meeting criteria for participation).
241 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 197; see BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, THE DIRTY
ENERGY DILEMMA: WHAT’S BLOCKING CLEAN POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2008).
242 Moot, supra note 16, at 348.
243 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,836 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
244 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 197-98.
245 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 770, 776 (2016).
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An example involves approval of requirements for participation in
wholesale markets. For example, the PJM RTO criteria for demand
response aggregators (which PJM calls “curtailment service providers,”
or “CSPs”)246 include such matters as “appropriate operational
infrastructure and a full understanding of all the wholesale market
rules and operational procedures.”247 Wholesale markets also have
detailed specifications for CSP participation.248
No state should be able to set these rules, as they are central to the
markets’ proper functioning. If, for example, states decided to set
different requirements for trading on wholesale markets, the result
would be chaos. Consider the analogy of a stock exchange, another
type of interstate transactional marketplace where market operator
rules are filed for approval with a federal regulator (in this case, the
SEC). Stock exchanges regulate members’ ability to participate in the
markets — how they qualify as members (minimum capital
requirements, for example), how they bid, how they handle and settle
orders, and so forth. If these procedural features of the market were
not subject to oversight by a central clearinghouse, it could lead to
fraud or other dysfunctions.249
The converse of this is that FERC cannot regulate conduct as
“practices” that does not involve direct market participants. Recall the
earlier example of the proposed shoe manufacturing plant in
Massachusetts.250 The shoe company would not face regulation under

246 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY SERVICES
MARKET OPERATIONS 109 (rev. Dec. 17, 2015), available at http://www.pjm.com/~/
media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx.
247 Demand Response, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/demandresponse.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016); PJM Tools FAQs, PJM, http://learn.pjm.com/
three-priorities/keeping-the-lights-on/pjm-tools-faqs.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016);
Retail Electricity Consumer Opportunities for Demand Response in PJM’s Wholesale
Markets 2, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/end-use-customerfact-sheet.ashx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
248 For example, PJM has detailed rules for CSP participation, such as requirements
to identify specific demand reduction resources by location and load reduction
capability. PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, supra note 246, at 110.
249 One exception to FERC’s authority over the markets involves its limited ability
to curb market manipulation, as shown by Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir.
2013). In Hunter, the D.C. Circuit held that FERC lacked authority to fine a former
natural gas trader for his allegedly fraudulent actions, determining that Hunter was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission because
his scheme operated solely within the commodity futures market. See William
Scherman, John Shepherd & Jason Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement: Due Process
Issues in the Post-EPAct 2005 Enforcement Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 77-78 (2010).
250 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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the FPA because it does not trade on the wholesale markets. State
regulatory judgments about the siting and location of the proposed
plant would not be supplanted, even if they might subsequently
impact the wholesale price of electricity. For this reason alone, the
D.C. Circuit erred when it found that FERC could theoretically
regulate the steel and labor markets. This slippery slope argument251
had no support in the law, because it was inconsistent with the
limitation to market participants. There is a robust body of literature
on slippery slope reasoning, which illustrates the many problems in
using it in cases such as this.252
As the Supreme Court noted, allowing FERC to regulate wholesale
market participants does not completely strip states of their authority
over such activities as demand response. Under FERC’s Order 719,
through its licensing authority, “any State regulator [could] prohibit
its consumers from making demand response bids in the wholesale
market.”253 This authority is similar to the securities context, where
state blue sky laws’ registration requirements govern broker-dealers’
bona fides. Like that context, state licensing requirements cannot
create an undue burden on participation in interstate markets, as the
D.C. Circuit has confirmed in rejecting a state’s demand response
licensing requirement it felt intruded on FERC’s authority.254 Neither
could a state simply bar CSPs from participating in wholesale markets.
Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, states that barred
individual firms from doing business on an interstate market would
251 “A slippery slope always assumes a chain reaction of cause-effect events which
result in some eventual dire outcome.” Common Fallacies In Reasoning,
FULLERTON.EDU, http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/rgass/fallacy3211.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2016).
252 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1027 (2003) (citing numerous articles and books).
253 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 770, 772 (2016); 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.28(g)(1)(i)(A) (2015) (ISO/RTOs may not accept demand response bids where
they are “not permitted by the laws or regulations of the relevant electric retail
regulatory authority”). To take one example of how this might work in practice, a
state could limit a CSP’s license to implementing a retail-level demand response
program on behalf of a utility.
Also, in that part of the nation without wholesale markets, demand response is done
at the retail level only. Individual utilities are responsible for demand response in
those states, and subject to state regulatory authority only.
254 Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(overturning an Indiana state law precluding customers from enrolling with
aggregators without the state commission’s prior approval); Eisen, Who Regulates The
Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 84 (describing barriers to demand response
participation).
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almost certainly be impermissibly regulating these firms’ reach beyond
the state.255
The carbon adder proposal would receive unequivocally favorable
treatment under this guideline. If the carbon price were structured as
an additional amount applying to sellers of generated electricity into
the markets, it would meet this guideline because it applies to buyers
and sellers, and not to any other entity.
2.

FERC Is Addressing System Adequacy by Regulating the
Quantity of Inputs to the Markets

The second factor derives from FERC’s mandate to ensure the
reliability of the wholesale power system. Throughout FERC v. EPSA,
the Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]n promoting demand
response, FERC did no more than follow the dictates of its regulatory
mission to improve the competitiveness, efficiency, and reliability of
the wholesale market.”256 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan
summarized the myriad of ways that expanded demand response can
improve system reliability.257 This focus on system reliability is
consistent with earlier decisions, including the capacity market cases
and South Carolina Public Service Authority. As the D.C. Circuit put it
in Connecticut DPUC, “reasonable concerns about system adequacy . . .
[are] within the heartland of the Commission’s section 206
jurisdiction.”258 FERC may act to adjust regional supply and demand
for electricity to ensure that rates are just and reasonable, as long as its
actions are not arbitrary and capricious. The capacity market cases, for
example, allow FERC to “indirectly incentivize action that it cannot
directly require so long as it is otherwise acting within its

255 Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights:
Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 631 (2004); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the
Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 310-11 (2013).
256 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 779.
257 Id. at 777:

And in the Rule under review, FERC expanded on that theme. It listed the
several ways in which “demand response in organized wholesale energy
markets can help improve the functioning and competitiveness of those
markets”: by replacing high-priced, inefficient generation; exerting
“downward pressure” on “generator bidding strategies”; and “support[ing]
system reliability.”
258

Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

2016] FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid

1839

jurisdiction.”259 That “incentive” can affect an “input into the marketbased mechanism”260 — the “input” in that case being the quantity of
energy or capacity traded on the markets. If FERC finds there is not
enough supply, for example, it may create incentives to prompt more
bidding into the markets.
FERC v. EPSA confirms that FERC can provide incentives to adjust
the quantity and quality of inputs to markets that it regulates to
maintain system reliability, even if that impacts the states. Both
demand response programs and capacity markets accomplish this by
promoting specific system resources (demand reductions and supply).
Critically, FERC can dictate the level of system resources, but cannot
directly regulate the states. For example, FERC could not require
construction of a specific power plant or condition wholesale sales on
a requirement that retail distribution utilities adopt a specific pricing
scheme.261 The ISO-New England ICR acts as an overall constraint on
regional power plant construction and reduces states’ flexibility, but
does not specify the construction of any individual plant.
In FERC v. EPSA, the Court noted that FERC promulgated Order
745 in part because it believed the amount of demand response in
wholesale markets was inadequate, which threatens the ability to meet
system peak demand.262 According to the Court, it is therefore up to
FERC, not the states, to establish the proper incentives to rectify this
situation.263 To be sure, states could impact FERC’s programs. For
example, retail-level demand response programs could impact the
wholesale markets: with more state-level demand response, an ISO/
RTO could adjust its projections of the amount of capacity needed in a
region by the anticipated amount of demand reductions. That is
neither prohibited, nor necessarily undesirable. In the interconnected
grid, actors will affect each other, and FERC’s plans to meet regional
supply and demand will have to adjust to take account of matters that
states control.
Now consider the case of the carbon adder. FERC could not simply
call it an “environmental” initiative; FERC has limited latitude to
directly consider environmental matters in its calculation of whether

259 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Edwards, J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760 (2016).
260 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
261 Cf. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 234 (making a similar argument).
262 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 777.
263 Id.
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rates are just and reasonable.264 Instead, it would need to make findings
about its impacts on system adequacy. FERC could re-cast the increase
in bid prices as a “reliability adder,” as discussed most recently by Emily
Hammond and David Spence. Actions designed to protect system
reliability can take a wide variety of forms. To Professors Hammond and
Spence, system adequacy “encompasses a suite of attributes (the ability
to serve several different grid needs), and no single generation source
has all of those attributes.”265 Thus, FERC could make findings that
system adequacy would be imperiled without more electricity from nonfossil sources. FERC may judge, for example, that increased amounts of
electricity generated from renewable sources are necessary to hedge
against potential outages at fossil-fuel fired plants. Or, perhaps, that
shorter lead times of certain renewable power plants would bring them
on the system more quickly.
FERC would be within its authority to cast a carbon adder in these
terms, because it would find support from both FERC v. EPSA and the
capacity market cases. FERC would ground a judgment about this
issue in terms of regional system adequacy, much as it did in those
cases. In this analysis, the “input to the market mechanism” is slightly
different: whether there is too much of a specific resource — and not
enough of others — on the regional grid. This fits comfortably within
a broad view of FERC’s reliability authority.266
3.

FERC Is Regulating Market-Wide Features to Remedy
Discrimination Against One Resource in Favor of Another

As FERC v. EPSA concluded, “the Commission’s justifications for
regulating demand response are all about, and only about, improving
the wholesale market.”267 This is wholly consistent with the numerous
previous cases that have confirmed that FERC is best placed to address
industry-wide changes, and that as a result, when FERC’s remedies
aim globally at the wholesale power system, “agency discretion is . . .
264 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 198 n.301 (citing Grand Council of the
Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
265 Id. at 42.
266 Id. at 41-42 (noting that FERC’s authority to consider reliability “is far more
easily settled than its ability to directly consider environmental factors” and claiming
that “a reliability and/or flexibility adder . . . might have better traction, both as a
jurisdictional and as a political matter [than a carbon adder]”); cf. JOHN MOORE, THE
SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT (2013), available at http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20130911144750-Moore%20Comments.pdf (discussing actions that FERC can take to
promote added incorporation of renewables in capacity markets).
267 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 776.

2016] FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid

1841

at its zenith.”268 Oversight of system-wide changes to market terms
and conditions is squarely within FERC’s purview. FERC v. EPSA and
these “zenith” cases show that “practices affecting rates” has evolved
from a meaning of practices of individual firms to those that affect the
entire market. The “system-wide” limitation is important; the
“practice” is the market structure and the remedy is to alleviate a bias
against a specific resource. In New York v. FERC, for example, the
Supreme Court observed “[w]ere FERC to investigate this alleged
discrimination [regarding unbundled retail transmission] and make
findings concerning undue discrimination,” section 206 “would
require FERC to provide a remedy for that discrimination.”269
To the Court, then, Order 745 was therefore justified because FERC
found that market structures hampered full development of demand
response, justified systemic regulation of this “practice affecting rates.”
As the Court noted, FERC compiled a lengthy record that existing
conditions resulted in inadequate demand response participation.270
Order 719 was designed to “eliminate barriers to the participation of
demand response in the organized power markets by ensuring
comparable treatment of resources.”271 In turn, Order 719 was based
on the policy established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that,
“unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in energy,
capacity and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated.”272 This
Congressional policy statement is itself not a jurisdictional limit, but
does provide further support for FERC’s action. Then, Order 745
found that policy inadequate, and fixed the level of compensation to
remove the barriers to demand response participation.273
Now consider the carbon adder. Under this factor, the failure to
internalize the environmental externalities in the market as a whole is
a “practice affecting rates” if it is justified with specific findings that
barriers to participation by renewable resources in wholesale markets
prevent those power plants from participating fully in wholesale
markets. The fact that electricity generated from other fuels is lower268 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2010); La. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Towns of Concord,
Norwood, & Wellesley v. FERC, 955 F.2d 67, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Eisen, Who
Regulates The Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 93; Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note
50, at 409 (noting FERC’s “broad remedial authority” in these circumstances).
269 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 27 (2002).
270 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 770-72.
271 Order 719, supra note 59, at 64, 107.
272 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1252(f), 119 Stat. 594, 966.
273 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 771.
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cost and therefore clears wholesale markets more readily is not
inherently discriminatory. As noted above, since the Progressive Era,
rate differentials have been permissible in certain circumstances. For
this reason, the barrier cannot simply be that the lower cost of
electricity generated from fossil fuel sources does not account for the
environmental externalities.274
A different sort of finding of discrimination against renewable
resources is possible. While a full treatment is beyond the scope of the
analysis here, one means of establishing discrimination might involve
findings that applying buyer-side mitigation (discussed above in the
New England case) to electricity generated from renewables “unfairly
reduces their capacity value and costs consumers money.”275 In ISONew England, for example, the MOPR typically precludes any capacity
market bids below minimum price thresholds set by the ISO, unless
the ISO grants an exemption. In several recent proceedings, FERC has
denied complaints requesting exemptions to the MOPR for renewable
energy resources required by state public policies (such as renewable
portfolio standards, which require a specific percentage of electricity
to be delivered from renewable sources).276 Were it to conclude
otherwise, there might be a foundation for a finding of discrimination.
4.

FERC’s Oversight Aims at Conduct that Directly and
Significantly Affects Wholesale Rates

The final factor is whether the activity has direct and significant
impacts on wholesale rates. Requiring an effect to be proximately
connected with rates is central to “directness,” This is consistent with
South Carolina Public Service Authority’s discussion of the “direct
economic relationship” between the regulated practice and wholesale
rates, and in harmony with Prior Notice’s requirement of filing of
documents that involved charges directly relating to rates. It is also
consistent with the holdings in the capacity market cases, because
there is a direct relationship between capacity requirement on regional
systems and the payments in capacity markets. Finally, the
274

See Moot, supra note 16, at 361.
MOORE, supra note 266, at 8. ISO New Eng. Inc. & New Eng. Power Pool
Participants Committee, 150 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2015) (discussing the limited
exemption from the ISO-New England MOPR).
276 See, e.g., New Eng. States Comm. on Elec. v. ISO New Eng. Inc., 142 FERC ¶
61,108 (2013), order on reh’g, New Eng. States Comm. on Elec. v. ISO New Eng. Inc.,
151 FERC ¶ 61,056 (Apr. 20, 2015). For a discussion of renewable portfolio
standards, see JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 758-67
(4th ed. 2015).
275
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requirement of significance provides more certainty: FERC would not
have jurisdiction over activities that did not significantly impact
market rates (licensing the shoe manufacturing plant, for example).
Both demand response and the carbon adder impact market rates
directly and significantly without the actions of an intervening
decision maker. As the FERC v. EPSA court recognized, in the case of
demand response, “it is hard to think of a practice that does so
more.”277 The Court noted that one of demand response’s principal
benefits is to serve as a safety valve to lower peak demand and rates.278
A market operator can bring demand response resources into the
markets as needed to bring demand down and reduce spiking
wholesale prices.279
With respect to the carbon adder, adding an amount to sellers’ bids
would fundamentally change the rate structure by altering market
bidding. The wholesale markets operate on a “‘security-constrained,
least-cost dispatch’ or ‘security constrained economic dispatch’
(‘SCED’) rule.”280 The SCED model relies on accepting lowest cost
bids subject to concerns about system reliability, taking account of a
variety of factors on the system, that is, “recognizing any operational
limits of generation and transmission facilities.”281 The carbon adder
would directly change the order in which resources are “dispatched”
(come on line) to serve customers, as electricity from some power
plants would cost more than it had before. Rates would be directly and
significantly impacted, without any intervention by a third party.
B. Addressing Potential Preemption of State Laws
A set of issues related to deciding whether FERC has impermissibly
intruded in an area where it has no authority involve whether FERC’s
actions preempt state laws impacting wholesale market operations,
which is a subject of considerable contention.282 In a modern
277

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 775.
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 50, at 401.
279 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 775; Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart
Grid?, supra note 3, at 91; Pierce, Demand Response, supra note 4, at 104.
280 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 155; see also FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED
ECONOMIC DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf
[hereinafter SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH].
281 FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH, supra note 280, at 10 (citing
EPAct 2005 § 1234).
282 Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries: A Call for Course
Correction, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Oct. 2014), http://www.gwlr.org/oneok-v-learjet/.
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interconnected electricity network, state laws and policies may
influence wholesale market rates. The wholesale markets are
interconnected to the retail markets, and courts have recognized this
relationship numerous times. The relationship to retail markets does
not preclude FERC from acting, as FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale
market practices holds even when its actions impact retail
customers.283
The reverse is not true. In the FPA, “Congress meant to draw a
bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction.
This was done in the [FPA] by making [FERC] jurisdiction plenary
and extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce except
those which Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by the
States.”284 As a result, states are barred from regulating matters within
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction,285 and the Supreme Court has rejected
the proposition that the “scope of [FERC’s] jurisdiction . . . is to be
determined by a case-by-case analysis of the impact of state regulation
upon the national interest.”286 States have no authority over the
wholesale markets. They have jurisdiction over retail sales, but the
FPA gives them no jurisdiction correlating to that of section 206 that
would give them a say over matters directly affecting the wholesale
markets, even if those activities relate to retail rates.287 Therefore, a
283 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-80 (1976)
(holding that FERC cannot refuse to consider retail rates in setting just and reasonable
wholesale rates). As Justice Scalia recognized in discussing the similar language of
section 1(b) of the NGA, FERC may regulate wholesale sales “with an eye toward
blunting the sales’ anticompetitive effects in the retail market — even though retail
prices are controlled by the States.” ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591,
1605 (2015) (citing Conway, 426 U.S. at 276-80) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
While the ONEOK decision rejected FERC’s authority over manipulation of the
natural gas market and allowed state antitrust laws to govern the traders’ conduct, it
does not detract from FERC’s overall ability to regulate wholesale market operations
under the practices affecting rates language. The conduct in ONEOK directly involved
non-jurisdictional retail markets as well as FERC-jurisdictional wholesale markets,
and the state laws “aimed at” general business conduct rather than the markets
themselves. Hammond, supra note 282.
284 FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
285 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 (1988); N. Natural Gas
Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963) (citation omitted); Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 274 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
286 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (quoting
S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215) (internal quotation marks omitted).
287 Brief for Delaware Division of the Public Advocate et al., in Support of Petition
for Certiorari at 18-19, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No.
14-840).
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state cannot directly regulate the wholesale market, for example, by
setting its own capacity market price. Thus, we should think of the
standard above as providing regulatory space for FERC to do what it
must to make the markets work properly, not simply preventing FERC
overreach. If FERC could not oversee mechanisms that form the core
of the wholesale markets, it would create the kind of regulatory gap
that Congress sought to correct when it adopted the FPA in 1935. This
interpretation of the FPA closes the Attleboro gap by ensuring that
FERC regulates when states cannot.288 As the Court recognized in
FERC v. EPSA, to do otherwise would leave certain activities
completely unregulated; the FPA was designed expressly to avoid
creating such regulatory “vacuums.”289
Questions remain, however, whether state laws that have independent
justifications but also impact the wholesale markets should stand. Order
745 did not involve preemption, as its opponents took issue with
FERC’s policy choice, not with its conflict, real or imagined, with any
settled state law.290 In other cases, it has been difficult to summarize
modern preemption analysis, and the judicial decisions are murky, but
solicitude for state interests has emerged as an important theme —
finding a balance between federal and state interests rather than
assigning exclusive spheres of regulatory authority.
In recent years, the issue of preemption relating to the electric grid
has arisen in several high-profile cases. The conflict with state law has
not been found to be express, but implied. The Supreme Court has
found preemption implied in several different scenarios.291 “Field
preemption” occurs when Congress, without expressly declaring that
state laws are preempted, nevertheless legislates so comprehensively as
to occupy the entire field of an issue. A second form of implied
preemption is “conflict” preemption, which, under current Supreme
Court precedent, occurs either when it is impossible for someone to
comply with both state and federal laws, or when the purposes and
objectives of federal law would be thwarted by state law.292 These two
scenarios are commonly known as “impossibility” preemption and
288

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002).
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
290 Amicus Curiae Brief of Energy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 15-16,
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief of Energy Law Scholars].
291 Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91
N.C. L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2013) (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 368-69 (1986)).
292 Id.
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“purposes and objectives” (or “obstacle”) preemption. The analysis of
obstacle preemption requires identification of the purposes and
objectives of the federal statute, and a determination of the extent to
which the state statute stands as an obstacle, if at all, to the
accomplishment of these purposes and objectives.293
There is a robust body of law on whether implied preemption is
constitutional or whether it should be applied in specific cases.294 The
analysis here takes current forms of implied preemption as a given.
Consider the type of law involved in the cases the Court has now taken
for argument after FERC v. EPSA: a state law that grants financial
incentives to prompt construction of new electric generating plants.295
The state’s interests may include promoting development of electricity
generation in the state, and a diverse generation mix,296 among other
goals. However, the state’s payment would yield revenue to the power
plant developer over and above the amount of capacity market
payments, and would therefore conflict with the ISO/RTO’s scheme of
providing a specific incentive through capacity payments. Field
preemption analysis was central to the decisions in the cases involving
these state laws (from New Jersey and Maryland).297 The Third and
Fourth Circuits, respectively, overturned these state laws as
293 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
294 See, e.g., Steven Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 39 (2005); Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void
Through Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2008); Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). For an analysis calling for more state control
over energy initiatives and less preemption, see Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the
Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and Local Voices in the Green Energy
Revolution, 64 CASE W. L. REV. 1619 (2014).
295 The New Jersey law was An Act Establishing a Long-Term Capacity Agreement
Pilot Program to Promote Construction of Qualified Electric Generation Facilities,
Amending and Supplementing P.L.1999, c.23, 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9 (West
2016). It established a “contract for differences” (“CFD”) method for providing
incentives for new generation. Under the CFD, a winning bidder would be paid (or
required to pay) based on the difference between its bid prices for energy and capacity
(as reflected in the CFD) and PJM’s corresponding price for capacity. The CFD
assured that the winning bidder will always be paid the greater of (1) the PJM price or
(2) the bidder’s winning bid price. 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9 §§ 3(b), 3(c)(4)
(West 2016).
296 Hammond & Spence, supra note 8, at 157 & n.79 (citing statutes from
Delaware, Florida, and New York directing state regulators to consider fuel diversity
in determining the need for new power plant capacity).
297 See, e.g., PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’n
for cert. filed Dec. 10, 2014; PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir.
2014), cert. granted Oct. 19, 2015.
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impermissible intrusions on FERC’s authority to set capacity market
prices because they distorted wholesale market rates. In these cases,
FERC was held to have occupied the entire field of wholesale market
regulation. In October 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Maryland cases to review these holdings on the preemption issue.298
Given FERC v. EPSA’s discussion of the interconnected nature of the
electric grid, in which actors pursue initiatives concurrently, scholars
have argued that conflict preemption is more appropriate than field
preemption for deciding whether FERC’s actions preempt state
laws.299 If FERC’s policies for the wholesale market threaten to
interfere with historical state authority, the proper way to address this
would be in a case-by-case preemption challenge.300 By contrast, field
preemption analysis leaves no role for the states when FERC takes
actions involving the wholesale markets. That is incompatible with the
central feature of the directness standard discussed in this Part: FERC
has expansive — but not unlimited — authority over matters relating
to the wholesale markets. When state law does not interfere with
FERC’s actions, it should stand.
The touchstone for conflict preemption analysis is congressional
intent. Unfortunately, this is both indeterminate in most situations, and
difficult (if not impossible) to apply here, given the lack of
congressional explication on “practices affecting rates” in the enactment
of the FPA. Thus, the standard and factors developed above can provide
useful insights about the extent of FERC’s authority in a given case, and
the extent to which state laws conflict with FERC’s actions.
Based on the four factors above, a conflict preemption analysis
might well reach the same result with respect to the Maryland laws as
the Third and Fourth Circuits did using a field preemption analysis. It
would be consistent with the central aim of the “directness” standard:
confirming the balance between federal and state authority. An
interpretation of the FPA that allocates jurisdiction in this setting must
manage the uncertainties in going forward in this complex industry
landscape, and accommodate the relative interests of FERC and the
states. In this interstate context, “effective regulation” no longer
requires rigid adherence to the notion of distinct spheres of
jurisdiction, but making the dividing line effective. Where specific
conflicts do exist, the challenge is to preserve a state regulatory role,
298

Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 467.
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the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1591, 1642-46 (2003).
299

1848

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:1783

for example, the states’ historical mandate to assess whether specific
purchases of power by utilities are prudent.301 That can be an
important function of the standard described here. There would still
be a robust regulatory role for the states; as the Supreme Court has
stated recently, “no one could claim that [this] regulation . . .
forecloses every other form of state regulation . . . .”302
CONCLUSION
The wholesale electricity markets are a work in progress. They are
an ongoing experiment primarily aimed at delivering low-cost
electricity to consumers — and a recent one at that — that does not
capture all values such as internalizing environmental externalities.
There is much untapped potential for FERC to act within its current
statutory authority to change the structure of these markets. After
FERC v. EPSA, there are many creative ways that FERC can act, and
there are many ways that states can act, some of which would
influence the markets.303 As the Court recognized, demand response
participation in wholesale markets is the epitome of this spirit of
experimentation, as it seeks to revamp the markets to introduce a
wholly new resource (demand reductions).
Widely held views of the FPA’s regulatory scheme believe it to be
outmoded as the electric power sector continues to evolve. However,
this Article concludes that after FERC v. EPSA, the New Deal-era FPA,
designed to rein in monopolists, has continuing relevance in allocating
jurisdiction between states and FERC in a modern market-based
context. The historical analysis in this Article does not propose a
particular type of experimentation, or a particular suite of actions for
FERC to use the wholesale markets to address climate change or
stimulate innovation. Nor, for that matter, does it attempt to resolve
long-standing policy differences between different levels of
government. Instead, it attempts to remove more of the uncertainty
about what FERC can do, and the limits of a statute that seems a
product of a bygone era.
Old statutes, as Jody Freeman and David Spence have cogently
argued, can apply to new problems.304 So it is here. The Court has now
found that FERC’s authority over ISO/RTOs and their wholesale
301
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markets gives it significant powers to make sweeping changes in the
markets. The standard enunciated here, based on well over 100 years
of precedent, attempts to lessen the dissonance among levels of
government. It outlines FERC’s broad authority — broader than some
would envision — but also provides limits on that authority to guide
policymakers at every level of government.

